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Abstract
This research investigJtcd whr.thcr expert evidence pertaining to
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) inOuences juror verdicts. ·rhe legal
requirements of self defence (imminence. propo11ionality and ar. attempt to
retreat from the situation) are generally not met in cases where battered ....·omen
kill their partner: The killings do not immediately follow the anack, the force
used is not proportionate to the attack. and there is often no previous attempt to
retreat from the situation. BWS expert psychological evidence has been
admitted by Australian Courts to provide jurors with an alternative perspective
for detennining whether a woman's actions were reasonable in the given
context. It is unclear whether the admission of such .. myth-dispelling"
evidence is necessary. A written summary of a trial transcript was given to 160
participants (80 male and 80 female), each of whom contributed to one of
sixteen conditions in a 2x4x2 design. The critical manipulations were as
follows: the presence I absence of a defence I prosecution expert; whether or
not the defendant had previously left the relationship; and sex of participant.
The fmdings provide some suggestion that expert ev~dence about BWS does
not significantly impact on verdict, although its effect may differ for males and
females.
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The effect of expert eviden~e pertaining to naucn:d Wurnan Syndrome on juror verid!cs

Chuptcr 1 - Introduction
This research investigated the impact and utility of expert evidence
pertaining to Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS). In recent years within the
Australian legal system, evidence about BWS has been introduced in cases
where female victims of domestic violence kiii their abusive partner, and
subsequently seek to rely on defences of duress, provocation and self defence.
Such evidence has significant implications for each of these defences, and this
thesis addressed some of the relevant issues pertaining to the use of B WS
within a self-defence defence. It is argued that Australian courts and
legislatures may need to reconsider the construction of the self-defence
defence to incorporate subjective notions of"reasonableness" and thus avoid
the need for extrinsic evidence such as BWS.

1.1 Expert Syndrome evidence in Australia
Syndrome evidence (eg. Rape Trauma, Abused Child, Repressed
Memory, Premenstrual, and Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS)) began to
emerge in Australian Courts in the 1990s (Freckelton & Selby, 1993-). The
evidence, generally given by psychologists or psychiatrists, attempts to isolate
a particular sub-group of the population and categorise their behaviour
differently from the rest of the population based on the psychological nature of
the relationship existing between the defendant and the victim. The evidence is
introduced to provide juries with an alternative perspective upon which to base
their final decision. Freckelton (1995) suggests that such syndromes
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"psychopathologisc conduct which is the product of stress'', and that "the
inferences sought to be drawn may be ideologically alluring but in the <:asc of
the syndromes arc likely to be scientifically dubious" (at 30).
There is so much weight placed on such evidence, and it is so widely
used in Australia that it is now viewed as a specialisation in its own right
(Freckelton & Selby, 1996). However, Australian courts arc beginning to
question the appropriateness of such myth-dispelling evidence. In tw"o recent
cases (J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 and F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502), the Appeal
Courts questioned the appropriateness, utility and role of counter-intuitive
evidence.
In F, a Paediatrician was called to give evidenct! that a child was
suffering from Accommodation Syndrome (a psychological theory which
purports to explain delay and inconsistencies of complaint by abused children).
The expert gave evidence of her medical findings on examining the
complainant as well as answering questions about the literature relating to the
Syndrome. The Court of Appeal ruled that her evidence was inadmissible for
the following reasons: (i) the expert was a Paediatrician, and therefore not an
expert in the field of psychology and psychiatry (which is where the concept of
the syndrome originated); (ii) the "syndrome" was not associated with
scientifically rigorous analysis and had a non-diagnostic nature; and (iii) such
syndrome evidence would only be admissible when it was specifically related
to the complainant and not presented in general tenns.
rn the case of J, it was held that expert opinion relating to BWS was
inadmissible "because it fell outside the principles governing the admissibility
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of expert opinion t:vidcncc" (at 522). This decision was based on the
individual cxpc11 in the case lacking suflicicnt expertise

<~nd

failing to

adequately c.xplain the basis and concepts surrounding BWS, rather than an
outright rejection ofBWS evidence per sc.

It is submitted in this paper that BWS has been admitted as cv;dencc in
Australian courts without adequate scrutiny of its scientific status as a
psychological phenomenon.

1.2 Battered Woman Syndrome
Battered woman syndrom< is a concept developed by Walker ( 1979,
1984, 1989, 1995) to describe the nature and extent of tile cycle of violence
suffered by battered women. According to Walker, there are three distinct
phases of violence associated with a "battering cycle": (1) tension building,
which includes verbal and minor physical abuse with the woman attempting to
avoid more severe abuse by placating the batterer; (2) the acute battering
incident, where the tension of phase one culminates in a severe beating: and
(3) loving contrition, where the batterer is remorseful and apologetic in
assuring the woman that the battering incident will not be repeated (Walker
(1979, 1989, 1995).
A battered woman is defined as one who has been through this
battering cycle at least twice (Walker, 1984). The time span of each phase may
vary between relationships, but as the cycle is repeated the level of violence
escalates. Howevtr, at the end of each cycle, the woman is

ag~in

convinced

that the battering will cease so she remains with the battcrcr (Walker, 1979,

)
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1989). Although \Valkcr advocated that this cycle of violence occurs in all
battered woman

ca~·cs,

she is careful to concede that c:uch individual case has

its own set ofclwractcristi~.:s. and that "there is no modr.:l fiJr domestic
violence" (Walker 19'!5, 33 ).
Although Walker originally premised BWS ~being exclusively
applicable to battered women, in more recent times it has been used in cases
where victims of child abuse have killed their abusers (Walker, 1995). Thus
the key criteria of BWS, helplessness, is not confined to women in abusive
relationships, and may be extended to other categories of abusive rdationships
which embrace wider issues (for example, care ufthe elderly or very young,
relationships between parents and children, homosexual relationships).
Although the syndrome by necessity focusses on the particular helpless
relationship. this pattern of responding is not suggested by Walker to
exclusively be the

dom;:~.in

of battered women.

Walker (19~9) argued that women who are repeatedly exposed to the
painful stimuli of battering (over which they have no control) respond with the
"classic" learned helplessness symptoms described by Seligman ( 1975).
Seligman argued that dogs given aversive shocks •'learned" that responding
was futile and therefore stopped. The dogs were subject to maltreatment and
given a simple means of escape from their physical confines. However the
dogs did not escape - Seligman inferred that they were conditioned by thf!
infliction of punishment and lost their capacity to avoid this punishment. This
theory was also extrapolated to, and tested with, human participants. However.
as discussed below, no parallel can validly be drawn between the situation of

4
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actual physical entrapment with which the dogs were i:Jccd, and that of a
battered woman.
According to Walker, on the basis of this theory of lcarnt:d
helplessness. battered women become passive, unmotivated to put up a lijjht,
and come to believe that nothing they do \viii stop the
women arc

unabl~

violcnc~.:

f,cctming. The

to make rational decisions for themselves, they bC'come

passive and dependent, and typically can't reach the decision to leave the
relationship.
There arc other aspects of battered women which \Valker (I 989)
identifies as further maintaining factors in such abusive relationships. These
include lack of financial resources to enable the woman to leave, obstades put
up by family and friends (many of whom may not believe the woman and even

if they do, will not support her), and having nowhere to go (besides the small
number of shelters which arc only temporal)'). Furthermore, many batterers
threaten their wives with hann to their children or themselves if they do
attempt to leave the relationship- such a threat to the woman's safety is often
greater if she actually leaves the relationshir.

J.3 Prevalence of domestic violence in Australia
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) conducted a survey of6300
women in 1996 in an attempt to measure the prevalence of physical and sexual
violence experienced by women. Violence was defined as "any incident
involving the occurrence, attempt or threat of e'tther physical or sexual assault"
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(ABS. 1996, p.J ). This Jr.: lin it ion was based on

a~.:tions

which \'-muh.J he

considt:reJ criminal ofl!:nccs.

Tarrant ( 11) 1)0 J suggcsb that the prr.:vah:m:t.:, scriou'>lll.:'>'> ant! duration
of domc:'itic \ iok·ncc is imru:-.:-.iblc to
figun:s are only

ac~.:LJratdy

ascertain. ami th;tt ollicial

unJer~cstimatcs- convt:ntional \\lsdom sug~r.:o..,t:.

probably tnlr.:. :\!though thr.:st: data wen: based on the
and the ddinition

llf ..

w{l~rcpon

this

io..,

of women.

violenct:" utili-;cd was \Crv broad. the n:portcd

prevalr.:ncc in the ABS records is the only officiJ.l

reco~d ofdom~.:stic

violenct:

Jvailable, and serves as the only available guide to the actual prevalence in

th~

community. Overall, the data suggest that the prevalence of violence agair...:>t
women in Australia is quite high.
The survey found that 23% of\1.:omen who have ever been :tarried or
in a de facto relationship experienced violence by a partner at sume time during

the relationship. Furthermore. half of the women who experienced violence by
a partner reported that more than one incident had occurred. Thus it seems
from these figures that approximately one quarter of the population of women
in Australia who have been in a relationship experience violence by their
partner at some stage in the relationship. However, the frequency with which
the violence occurred is not detailed in the statistics.
According to the ABS statistics, three percent of women with a current
partner experienced violence by their partner in the previous 12 month period.
Eight percent of these women reported at least one incident of violence at
some time during the current relationship.

6
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Twelve percent of women who experienced violence by a current male
partner said they curn:ntly lived in fcnr as a result of that violence, whilc 60%
of women \\·ho had t·.xrericnccd violence in previous relationships reported

living in tt:ar whilc in that relationship.

Half of the women (51%) who experienced violence by a previous
partner finally ended their relationship due to the violence they experienced or
threats against their children. Furthl!rmore, 48% of women who >:!xpericnced
violence by a previous partner separated from their previou!' .. ·.1ncr and
returned before finally separating.

1.4 The law ofselfdcfence in Australia and Western Australia
Self defence is a total defence to murder- a successful plea provides
justification and acquittal of the accused. PrO\rocation on the other hand is a
qualified defence, providing only an excuse and reduced culpability. It has
been argued that both provocation ami self dt·fcnce fail to recognis.: the power
dynamics involved in domestic violence by distorting the \vomcn · s experience

of domestic violence {Tarrant, I990).
Bradfield (1998) examined fifty four AustrJiian cases bet\..·cen 1979
and 1997 in which a woman was charged with murdering her\ iolent partner.
This revealed a preference for the women to usc the prm ocati,)n defcncc. and
infrequent success when self defence was used. Orad field argw:d that this
greater reliance on provocation means more women who kill ahu:-:ivc partners

may be convicted of manslaughter rather than being acquitkd throug.h :;df
defence.

7

'

The effect or exrcrt evident:c pertaining tu !I-01Hercd WnnHU1 \yndrumc on juror vcridln

The leading Australian common law authority on self dclt:ncc.: is that of

R v Zecevic (( 1986) 25 ACrimR 14 ), a High Court decision which ruled that
the defence must prove the following to justify a defence of self-defence:
i) the accused acted in self defence;

ii) the accused believed the f-Jrce used in the particular situation was
reasonable; and
iii) that an ordinary person would believe the force used in the particular

situation was reasonable.
The decision of Zecevic means that a jury must consider the
reasonableness of the belief of the accused- the jury must be satisfied both
objectively and subjectively of the reasonableness of this belief. Thus whether
the accused believed the force used in the particular situation was reasonable
(the subjective test), is an additional requirement to whether an ordinary
person would believe the force used in the particular situation was reasonable
(the objective test). Expert evidence pertain;ng to BWS has been introduced to
address both the objective and subjective aspects of"reasonableness".
The jurisdiction of Western Australia is a code jurisdiction which has
similar laws relating to self defence. Sections 248 and 249 are the main self
defence provisions in the Criminal Code Act1913 (WA), and require that an

unlawful assault be the trigger for the violence used. Self defence can be
pleaded when the force results in death, provided that the force was not
intended or likely to cau>e death or Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) (Prow
(1989) 42 A Crim R 343 and Ellem (1994) A Crim R 370). Furthermore, the
force must be reasonably necessary to repel the attack, and the accused must

8
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have reasonably believed that death I GBII would result from the allack on
them, and reasonably believed that there was no other way to avoid the injuries
than the force they used (Man•·ey ( 1977) 18 ALR 77; and Muratuvic [1967j
QdR 15). The test of reasonableness is an objective test (Lawrie [1986J 2 QdR
502).
Traditional requirements of self defence (imminent harm, obligation to
retreat, and proportional response) are no longer requirements per se, but the
absence of them will most likely impair a defendant's claim of self defence
(Hubble, 1997). Feminist writers argue that although requirements of
imminence :etreat and proportionality have been removed from legal doctrine,
they are still used (Brown, 1998; Eastel, 1992a; Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie
!992; Stubbs, 1992; Tarrant, 1990). Self defence is thus said to be framed in
terms of equally-weighted strangers facing immediate violence (as in the
typical bar room brawl), and it is argued that the current law is not adequate to
account for the cumulative, debilitating and belittling effects of domestic
violence against women in the home (Brown, !998).
Many cases where women have killed their abusive husbands often
appear not to meet the three aspects of self defence mentioned above
(imminence, proportionality and retreat): The killings generally do not
immediately follow the attack, the force used is not proportionate to the attack,
and there is often no previous attempt to retreat from the situation (as noted by
Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, !992; Stubbs, !991; Stubbs and Tolmie, !994;
Tarrant, 1990).

9
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It has been argued that a model of self defence J(Jcusing on imminence
is inappropriate for women killing in response to regular ahusc, as the killing

often occurs independently of a specific threatening incident (Tarrant, 1990).
However, others have suggested that 8 WS should in fact be used to broaden
the concept of"rcasonableness" in self defence cases (Eastcl, 1992b).
In cases where the accused's conduct occurs well after or indeed before
an anticipated attack, it is hard to argue that the fear of death or belief in the
necessity of actions were reasonable (Hubble, 1997; Tarrant, 1990). Self
defence thus has difficulty ~ dealing with situations where there is no actual
imminent confrontation or threat of future harm (Stubbs & Tolmie, 1994).
Furthermore many women who kill their abusive partner have often not left the
relationship in the past. Such women would not satisfy the "retreat" aspect of
self defence.
A battered woman's response is seen as unreasonable from an
objective standard, as jurors cannot imagine what it is to be the ''reasonable"
person in that particular situation (Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, 1992; Stubbs,
1991; Tarrant, 1990). Thus the reasonableness requirement is a major hurdle in
bringing the action of many women who kill their partner within the rubric of
self defence. In viewing the history of abuse from the battered woman's
perspective (through evidence ofBWS), notions of reasonableness can be
ascertained and it is then possible to see her actions as constituting reasonable
self-preservation. Thus BWS provides courts with the means for broadening
the interpretation of what is reasonable with respect to self defence.

10
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requirements of self defence to incorporate BWS. Although it is a positive
thing to provide such women with a means of utilising self-defence, expansion
of the legal requirements to meet a small proportion of the population would
be unwise. Any reform to the law of self defence should be over-arching and
encompass all potential defendants. As Hubble ( 1997) warns:
Self defence is becoming somewhat overburdened by
expectations that are unlikely to bear fruit. While it is vital that
battered women's claims to self-defence are given proper
recognition and equal treatment by the law, it is also important to
recognise the doctrinal limitations which are inherent in that
defence, and the difficulties that may result from any attempt to
exceed those limitations ... we must not be hostile to the reality
that battered women kill for a variety of reasons, not all of which
can be readily analysed under the rubric of self-defence" (p. 116)

1.5 Expert evidence pertaining to BWS
BWS is not a defence in itself, but expert evidence pertaining to it is
used to assist Courts in the defences of self-defence, provocation and duress in
criminal cases where a woman has allegedly killed her abusive partner. Such
evidence is used to bolster the case of either the defence or the prosecution
(although in Australia the evidence appears to have only been used by the
defence to date) by providing jurors with information to assist their
understanding of the situation in which the battered woman finds herself.

II
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The justification for the usc of such cvitlencc is to provide jurors with
an alternative framework within which to objectively assess the reasonableness
of the woman's actions. The assumption is that jurors would not be able to
objectively assess such a situation without the expert psychological evidence.
The effect of such evidence in cases where banered wives kill their husbands
is unclear, and that is the focus of this research.
The number of Australian cases in which expert evidence pertaining to
Battered Woman Syndrome has been admitted is steadily growing. The
following is a brief survey of the relevant cases to date.
BWS was frrst recognised and admitted as expert evidence in Runjanjic

and Kontinnen (1991) 53 ACrimR 362. This case involved two women who
were both involved with one man in a violent, sexual relationship. The accused
women were

conv~cted

of false imprisonment and causing grievous bodily

harm to a third party. They appealed on the basis of duress, by claiming their

will was overborne due to the threat of violence by their partner and that he
forced them to detain the third party (another woman). The High Court of
Australia allowed the appeal against conviction on the bnsis that BWS
evidence should have been allowed on the issue ofwh~ther the accuseds' will
was overborne, and whether "women of reasonable firmness" in the same
position would have succumbed to the pressure to commit these offences.
KingCJ held that there was a sufficient body of knowledge to qualify BWS as
expert opinion, and that the evidence was outside the ordinary experience of
jurors and should be allowed as such. With respect, it seems that the expert
evidence was introduced by the Chief Justice without adequate scientific

12
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scmtiny of the syndrome itself. Once accepted as expert evidence by the lligh
Court in this casl!, BWS has subsequently been used in other Australian courts.
One of the same accused, Konf;innen (unreported) SA Sup Crt Mar
1992 no. BC9200466, later killed the abusive man and pleaded self defence.

However, the killing occurred while the victim was asleep, so did not meet the
immediacy aspect of self defeitCe. Expert evidence was introduced to show
that the defendant was suffering from BWS, could not leave the relationship
and believed her life was in imminent danger.
In Hickey (unreported) NSW Sup Court April1992, the defendant
killed her partner when he threw her off the bed and head-butted her. The

killing occurred during an assault, so was easily identifiable as self defence.
The expert evidence was used as part of the self-defence defence to explain
why the defendant had no other choice but to kill her abuser, and that the

accused believed the stabbing, was necessary for her self-defence.
In Woolsey (unreported) NSW Sup Court Aug 1993 no 70035, the
defendant was assaulted by her partner, went to the kitchen, got a knife and
stabbed him to death. The trial Judge held that the defendant suffered form
BWS and allowed the defendant to plead to manslaughter rather than murder.

BWS was used "not in the context of the law relating to self defence, but
rather in the context ... of a powerful mitigating circumstance" (per Newman

J).
In Chhay ( 1994) 72 A Crim R 1, the Appeal court ruled that the trial
judge should have instructed the jury that a history of battering could produce
a loss of self control necessary to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter.

13
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In Rah_v (unreported) Vic Sup Court Oct 1994, the ddl:rulant was charged with
murder. Expert evidence was introduced to show that shc suffered from BWS.
She was found Not Guilty of murder but Guilty ofmansluughtcron the
grounds of provocation - the jury apparently could not sec her act of stabbing
the victim while he was drunk (and hours after he last assaulted her) as
constituting self defence.
The defendant in Osland (unreported) Vic Crt ofCrim App Aug 1997
no 279 was convicted of murdering her violent husband, although her son did
the physical act of killing. An appeal against this conviction to the Victorian
Court of Criminal Appeal was not allowed. However, the defendant in this
matter was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court in February 1998
on the grounds that evidence pertaining to BWS should have been admitted as
part of the defences of provocation or self-defence. This appeal was
unsuccessful.
So it can be seen that the cases in which BWS has been introduced in
Australian courts vary in the circumstances of the accused and her abusive
relationship. However, in none of the cases has there been a comprehensive
analysis of the scientific validity, or overall utility of such evidence.

1.6 A legal and psychological critique of Battered Woman Syndrome
The utility ofBWS evidence has received much attention in the legal
and psychological literature. Many authors have expounded the dangers
inherent in rigid classification and medicalisation within the legal context, and
the possibility of it reinforcing pre-existing biases of jurors (DeWitt,
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Richardson & Warner, 1997; E;;lstel, l992b; hcckelton, IIJ92, JIJ94, 1995,
1997; Freckl!lton & Selby, IIJ96; Sheehy eta!, 1992; Stubbs, 1992).

It has been argued thatthc battered woman's situation is nH.:Jicaliscd through
the imposition of a syndrome, and a framework of characteristics to •.vhich she
must conform (Brown, 1998; Freckclton 1992, !994; Schneider, 1986). It has
been suggested that this may in fact preclude many women who do not fit lhc
symtpomatology of the syndrome from relying on the defence (Rogers, !996;
Sheehy et al, 1992; Stubbs, 1992; Tarrant, 1990). Furthermore, some women

in fact may choose not to rely on BWS, as they do not want to 1:-e represented
as a victim (Schneider, 1992).
Freckelton (1992) has argued that the danger arises when the medical
term "syndrome" is adopted and the therapeutic tool is used for purposes for
which it is not suited; he suggests that evidence pertaining to common
reactions exhibited in certain situations is acceptable, but admitting the
evidence as a syndrome should not be pennitted. He argues that the expert
testimony should be introduced to educate jurors about a battered woman's
situation rather than providing a diagnosis as such (Freckelton, 1994).
The scientific validity of Walker's research has been questioned in the
legal and psychological literature. DeWitt et al (1997) argue that expert
evidence which is not well-founded in science should not be admitted, as it has
the possibility of (incorrectly) reinforcing pre-existing biases of jurors.
Faigman (1986) presents a methodological critique of Walker's cycle
of violence and concludes that the data does not support the conclusions
drawn. Faigman notes that there was no control group of non-battered women
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to which to compare the battered woman group. Furthermore, the data which
fonned the basis ofBWS was derived from sclf-n.:ports of volunteers, whieh is
a notoriously unreliable method of collecting dat<J. Leader-Elliott ( 1993) raises
similar arguments and also quest1ons the scientific basis for Walker's
conclusions.
Some feminist writers criticise the syndrome's emphasis on the
psychological state of the offender rather than the actual circumstances of
domestic violence in which she lived (Beri, 1997; Rogers, 1996; Stubbs &
Tolmie, 1994), as well as the voice of the expert being preferred over that of
the women herself(Brown, I 998; Sheehy eta!, I 992). However these
arguments seems to beg the question: Feminist writers seem to be advocating
for the women to be viewed from a different perspective, which is exactly what
B\YS provides. Furthennore, a trial situation necessitates an examination of all
the circumstances of the case, which includes the physical situation as well as
the mental state of the defendant. Indeed, tbe law of seif defence requires
consideration of both the objective and subjective elements.
Another criticism raised of BWS is the applicability of the learned
helplessness paradigm to battered women (Faigman, 1996). It is submitted
here that Walker has inappropriately extrapolated Seligman's paradigm. It is
not possible to draw a parallel between the dogs and battered women: the dogs
in Seligman's research were physically trapped in their cages, and had no
opportunity to escape. Battered women are not usually prevented from leaving
their home (although some are), and so are not physically trapped, although
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they may be psychologically trapped. It is circular rcnsoning to say that the
dogs were also psychologically trapped. as this cannot be disproved.
FLrthcrmorc, there is a logical inconsistency in applying the learned
helplessness paradigm

w women who subsequently kill their partner (Brown,

1998; Schuller & Vidmar 1992; Sheehy ct al, 1992; Stubbs & Tolmie, 1994). It
seems counter-intuitive for a so-labeled "helpless" person to take the very
proactive action of taking a life. As Leader-Elliott ( 1993) argues, "The concept
of learned helplessness ... has the paradoxical effect of transfonning an
assertive act of self defence into a manifestation of weakness and incapacity"
(411).
The Supreme Court Judge who delivered the landmark Canadian
decision of Lavallee v R (!990, 55 CCC (3d) 97), which endorsed the use of
BWS in self-defence cases. referred to the pervasiveness of myths and
stereotypes which ar..! likely to affect juries sitting on BWS cases. Madam
Justice Wilson said: '"The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to
circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the
hypothetical "reasonable man"". (Lavallee at 114). This case and subsequent
legal changes in Canada and America have been hailed by feminists as a
victory for women facing such charges (Martinson, MacCrimmon, Grants &
Boyle, 1991).
However, it is still unclear as to how (or if) these biases actually
operate - whether in a positive or negative manner for battered women who
kill. Furthermore, the effect ofBWS (which purportedly dispels myths) has not
been investigated in depth.
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Some authors !mvc argued dmt biased generalisations anti
un-:.Ibstanliatcd misconceptions held by 1hc lay public about wife ah11sc arc
potential obstacll.'s to a woman's claim of self dciCncc in BWS cases (Bcri,

1997; Freckelton; 1994; Schneider, 1986; Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan. 1994;
Sheehy et al, 1992; Stubbs, 1992; Stubbs & Tolmie, 1994; Tarrant, 19YO),
while others claim the bias is more favourable to the accused woman and that
from a feminist perspective, should be so t3.vourable(Eastcl 1992a, 1998;
Gillespie, 1989).
Another argument raised in the feminist literature is that although the
courts may recognise and acknowledge the horrible situation of women in
violent relationships, they continue to deny that the woman had reasonable
grounds for her belief that killing was necessary. Stubbs and Tolmie (1994)
argue that the use ofBWS in Australian courts is troublesome as it has "been
used to reinforce and lend medical and professional credibility to, the very
stereotypes about women's passivity, masochism and responsibility for
domestic violence that it was developed in order to challenge". Similar
arguments are presented by Brown (1998); Martinson et al (1991); Rogers
(1996); and Sheehy et al (1992). Martinson et al (! 991) argue that a woman's
belief is more likely to be viewed as reasonable if historical, social and gender
constraints are recognised.
Sheehy et al (1992) argue that prevailing community myths and
stereotypes about a womans' failure to leave the relationship, her enjoyment of
the violence, her passivity and the "private" nature of domestic violence .setve
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to undermine notions of reasonahlem:ss. Schnc idcr (I 9X6) argues that I~ WS
merely transfonns the "old stcrcotyrcs into a new f(mn" (215 ).
However other authors argue that the perceived hio1s is more favourable

to the accused woman (cg. Eastcl, 1992a, Gillespie, lfJH9). For example, 0'
Donovan (I 993) argued that there is an intuition held by the public that a longterm experience of being a victim of violence may justify a woman killing her
batterer.
Stubbs ( !992) argues against the use of BWS on the basis that it
entrenches inequities that women face in the law:
It does not tackle fundamental problems ofthe legal system but
rather re-defines and remakes women's lives and experiences in a
manner which fits them into the prevailing narrow masculine
{egal strictures. The battered woman syndrome is a construction
which meets the law's needs not women's needs (at 270).
Eastel (I 992b) argues that by simply setting up a framework of symptoms
which women must meet, BWS presents no cha11enge to ongoing male
violence. However, this argument lacks substance: a criminal court hearing a
defence to a criminal charge is not the appropriate forum for "challenging"
male violence- the expert is there to provide jurors with a greater
understanding of the subjective aspects of the woman's situation, not to
advocate on behalf of her and other women in similar situations.
BWS constructs a different standard of behaviour against which a
reasonable battered woman is to be judged. It is argued here that this provides
Australian Courts with a means for inappropriately broadening the
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interpretation of what is "reasonable" with n:spcd to self-defence.
Furthcnnore, the admissibility of this type of evidence appears to have been
done without any scnlliny of the scientific status of this syndrome (Faigman,
1986; Freckelton, 1992; Hubble, 1997; Leader-Elliott 1993; Schneider 1986).
McMahon ( 1999) presents a compelling critique of the scientific
validity and legal utility ofBWS. A comprehensive review of psychological
and legal literature and relevant Australian case law leads her to the conclusion
that there is "some doubt as to whether expert evidence on battered woman
syndrome is really necessary to disabuse members of a jury of myths and
stereotypes concerning domestic violence" {p. 43). It is submitted here that
there may indeed be no utility ofBWS in cases where a woman kills her
abusive partner.

1.7 Experimental investigation of expert evidence pertaining to BWS
The nature and influence of juror attitudes and preconceptions about
domestic violence and battered women is problematical. Research in this area
tends to lack scientific validity which casts some doubt on the results
proffered. There is a substantial body of American and Canadian literature
investigating the use of expert evidence in BWS cases. These studies have
primarily focussed on the effects of expert evidence pertaining to BWS on
juror verdicts. Tht!se studies have come to somewhat different conclusions
about the utility of BWS. Furthermore, there does not appear to have been any
systematic investigation of such issues in Australia.
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BWS specific to the particular case under consil

1

:wn. The aim of thi:i

research was to examine the effect of expert evidence on verdict. A moderate
shift in verdicts From murder to manslaughter was reponed in both expert
conditions compared to the control condition. The author concluded that the
presence of expert evidence led to more favourable imcrpn:tations of the
battered woman's claim to self defence. llm•,-'evcr. then::

\~as

no counter expert

to challenge the BWS evidence in this research and the !>ample was comprised

of a limited student population.
A similar study by Schuller and Hastings ( 1996) sought to compare the
effect of two Forms of expert evidence on verdict, as well as examining the
defendant's prior response to the violence perpetrated against th(.'lll. Mnrc 1\ot

Guilty verdicts were rendered by participants who received expert evidence
about BWS or expert evidence about the "~ocial agency'' of the battered

woman (in this condition, BWS was not labelled I nJ:ncd as such. but the
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situation and difficulties which battered women may face were explained to
the jury) than those

pa~·;J . . ipants

who had not received any expert evidence.

This study also varied the woman's response history (as either "active" or
"passive"), but this reportedly had no efTect on verdict.
An American study investigating factors which may predict verdicts in
cases where battered women kill their partner, manipulated the following
variables: the level of force used by the husband, the judicial instructions, and
the presence I absence of expert evidence (Follingstad, Polek, Hause, Deaton,
Bulger, & Conway, 1989). College students were used as participants. It was
found that the first two factors influenced the verdict to a greater extent than
the inclusion of expert evidence. However, eighty percent of respondents who
received expert testimony considered that evidence to be influential in their
verdict. It was concluded that situational factors of the abuse and personal
characteristics of the battered woman were more indicative of verdict than any
attitudes I biases of the mock jurors. Although the authors claimed some effect
of expert testimony in the self defence scenarios, this result should be treated
with caution as the facts of the case were a "typical" self defence scenario: the
man coming at the woman with a weapon and the woman defending herself
with lethal force. However, it is interesting to note than even with the
imminence requirement being present, expert evidence still had very little
effect on verdict. Thus the results are not particularly infonnative about
"typical" battered woman cases where the retaliation is not an immediate
response to an imminent threat.
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Greenwald, Tomkins, Kenning and Zavodny ( 1990) examined the
subjectiveness of juror's decisions by varying the judicial instructions while
holding all facts of the case constant. Thus, mock jurors (university
undergraduates) received either no self-defence instructions, '·physical self
defence" instructions, "psychological self-defence" instructions or a mixture of
physical and psychological instructions. It wa.:. hypothesised that the
participants in the two conditions involving "psychological" instructions
would be more likely to acquit the defendant than those in the other two
conditions. Jurors read a vignette which contained a description of the
woman's situation, expert evidence and judge's instructions. There is no
indication in the methodology that this vignette took the fonn of a trial
transcript, so the generalisability of these results is questionable. The
proportion of Not Guilty verdicts for each condition was as follows: 10%
{control), 20% (physical), 44% (psychological), 46% (physical and
psychological). It was argued that these results supported the proposal of
Ewing (I 987) that there is a subjective psychological aspect employed by
jurors in deciding BWS self defence cases.
Finkel, Meister and Lightfoot (1991) purpotted to compare the
objective and subjective perspective of "reasonableness" from the juror's
viewpoint, by comparing three different types of self defence cases (a battered
wife who kills her partner, a subway shooting and a rape victl!n who kills her
attacker). This study used a group of university undergraduates and a nonstudent adult population. Variables were based on self-defence requirements:
the seriousness of the harm, proportionality of force, retreat, imminence and
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presence of expert evidence. A greater willingness to render Not Guilty
verdicts was found for BWS cases compared to the other two. There were no
gender differences and no differences found between the student and nonstudent groups. However these rcsLllts should be treated with great caution, as
it is not possible to draw any meaningful conclusions about the effect ofBWS
on verdicts when comparing three very different fact situations.

1.7.1 Gender differences in BWS research
Differences have been found between males and females with respect
to community attitudes about domestic violence. A study by Reddy, Knowles,
Mulvany, McMahon & Freckelton (1997) found differences between males
and females concerning the degree of harm attributed to a woman in a
domestic violence situation. Female participants felt that the woman faced a
greater degree of harm than the male participants. Such preconceptions may
influence juror verdicts in cases where a battered woman kills her partner. It
could be hypothesised that er.pert evidence about BWS may have a greater
impact and effect on verdict for women than men, as they may be better able to
imagine themselves in the same position as the defendant.
An Australian study by Struik ( 1996), which compared verdicts of

male and female jurors, found that female jurors were more likely to give a
Not Guilty (self defence) verdict for the defendant whereas male jurors were
more likely to give a Guilty (murder) or Guilty (manslaughter) verdict.
Two of the studies discussed above (in section 1.7) found the following
differences in verdict between male and female participants:
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• Schuller and Hastings ( 1996) found that males rendered more Guilty
verdicts compared to females (65% compared to 48% respectively). Female
respondents also perceived the woman to be in a more desperate and helpless
situation than males.
• Schuller (1992) suggested that the results of her study, showing that
females were more lenient in their verdicts than males, may have been partly
due to the females' "greater understanding and knowledge of the battered
woman's situation" (at 616).

1.7.2 Gender differences in other research
Research has been conducted investigating gender differences in
verdicts in child sexual assault, rape and recovered memory cases. The
fmdings of this body of research are equivocal. Some studies found gender
differences such that male.participants were more likely to fmd the [male]
defendants Not Guilty than female participants (eg. Crowley, O'Callaghan &
Ball, 1994; Bull Kovera, Levy, Borgida & Penrod, 1994; Gabora, Spanos &
Joab, 1993; Clark& Nightingale, 1997; Fischer, 1991; McNamara, Vattano &
Viney, 1993). However other studies in these areas found no gender
differences in verdicts between male and female participants ( eg. Hahn and
Clayton, 1996; Nelligan, 1988; Riedel, 1993).

It is not possible to draw direct analogies between these studies and the
present research, as these studies were investigating different offences to that
under consideration in this research, and in each case the defendant was a
male, whereas this research looked at a female defendant. However, thr
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inconsistency of these findings is illustrative of the difliculty in understanding,
or indeed explaining the mechanisms of, or reasons for, such gender
differences.

1.7.3 Shortcomings of past research
All of these studies used an undergraduate student population as their
sample- such a sample is not representative of the population, and may
produce unrepresentative results.
Furthennore, none of these studies examined what the outcome would
be if the prosecution led with its expert evidence which disputed the BWS
expla.Jation- it is quite possible in the Australian legal system for the
prosecution to call a "counter" expert in anticipation of the defence calling
one. This may influence the effect of the defence expert's evidence on juror
verdicts.

1.8 Purpose of the study
There does not appear to have been any Australian research which
examines the effect ofBWS evidence in self defence cases. The present study
provides some insight by investigating the effect, if any, of expert evidence in

cases where a battered woman has killed her partner. In using a general sample
from the population (not simply student participants), it provides a more
realistic picture ofthe likely effect ofexprrt evidence pertaining to BWS.
Furth~rmore, in introducing expert evidence from both the defence AN~ the
prc~!;cution,

'

any effects of the prosecution evidence disputing the BWS
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explanation can be explored. As noted by Vidmar and Schuller ( 1989), there is

n possibility that when mock jurors arc fnccd with conflicting opinions about
BWS, they may return to their own set of values and belie!:<> about such
situations. Indeed, Brekke and Borg ida ( 1988) found that mock jurors in a rape
trial presented with expert evidence from the prosecution countering the
defence evidence on Rape Trauma Syndrome, gave similar responses to the
control group, with no expert evidence.
Despite claims in the literature that battered women often do not meet
the "retreat" aspect of self defence (eg. Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, 1992;
Stubbs, 1991; Stubbs and Tolmie, 1994; Tarrant, 1990), there does not appear
to have been any investigation into the effect of this aspect on verdict. Thus,
the retreat element of self defence will be varied - whether the defendant had
left the relationship on previous occasions or not. This variable is included to
ascertain whether a specific aspect of the woman's situation will influence
verdict, a11d whether it will interact with the type of expert evidence proffered.
This will allow for a more specific investigation of exactly which aspects of
BWS do influence jurors in their decisions.
This research thus explores the mechanisms and effect of expert
evidence pertaining to BWS when it is presented for either the defence or
prosecution or both. The research also investigated whether public perceptions
differ for a woman who has actually left the relationship on previous
occasions, compared to one who has had the opportunity to leave, but has not
in fact left.
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Chapter 2 - Method
2.1 Design
The design of this research was a 2 x 4 x 2 factorial between
participants design, in which the independent variables were sex of
respondent; presence I absence of expert witness for prosecution and defence;
and whether the defendant had "retreated" ie left her husband on previous
occasions. There were thus eight experimental conditions. The dependent
variables were verdict; type and length of sentence; and influences on verdict.

2.2 Participants
Participants were recruited by the researcher and individuals known to
her. Each of these people distributed a number of booklets containing the
research material to an equal number of males and females who were as
different (with respect to age and occupation) from each other as possible. This
was done in an effort to achieve a sample representative of the general
population, and to avoid confining the results to a sample of university
students.
The sample comprised 160 participants, with ten male and ten female
participants in each of the eight conditions, thus making a total of 16 separate
conditions. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 70 with a mean of 39 years of
age. Thirty nine percent were under 30, 23% were between 30 and 45, and
38% over 45 years of age. From an education perspective. the sample was
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skewed, with approximately 65% having a university tdw.::ation, and all
participants having reached at least sccondaryMlcvcl schooling. This diftCrs
from the overall Australian population, of which only 40.4% have attained a
postMschool qualification, and 36.3% have not completed secondary school
(ABS, Australian Social Trends, 1998). There were a variety of occupations
represented in the sample, including trades (9 %), homemakers (12 %),
students ( 14 %), professionals ( 19 %), associated professional (26%), and
administrative staff ( 12 %).

2.3 Materials
Each participant was given a booklet containing an explanation of the
project and instructions for completion of the task (Appendix A); a consent
form to be signed and reu1med (Appendix B); a transcript of a trial (see
Appendix C); and a questionnaire about the trial (see Appendix D) 1.

2.3.1 Transcript
The transcript was a shortened version of a mock trial of a fictional
woman, Rosemary Forrester, who was facing a charge of murdering her
husband. The content of the case was based on cases cited in the literature, but
was not a reproduction of any one particular case. Evidence was presented by
the defendant that she had been physically, emotionally and sexually abused by
her husband for twelve years, and that she stabbed him five times after a 12
hour abusive incident.
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All transcripts in the eight conditions were the s;unc with respect to
most of the lhcts of the case. The length oft~Je transcript ranged from II to 16
A4 pages (singlc~spaced). depending on the experimental condition.
Each transcript contained the following: (i) opening statements by the
prosecution and defence lawyers, in which they outlined their case to the jury;
(ii) evidence from a forensic pathologist, detailing the fatal injuries and other
internal injuries of the victim (and cross examination); (iii) evidence from the
police officer who attended the scene, and conducted the Record of interview
with the de;'endant; (iv) evidence from the defendant about her relationship
with the victim (and

cross~examination);

(v) evidence from a medical records

officer regarding the defendant's past admissions to hospital; (vi) closing
statements from both lawyers in which they summarised the main arguments
of their case; and (vii)

thejud~;cs

instructions to the jury, including an

explanation of the elements of murder and manslaughter, a summary of the
expert's evidence, and the legal requirements for a verdict of not gmlty by
reason of self defence.
2.3.1.1 Expert
The critical manipulation in this study was the presence or absence of
expert evidence on Battered Woman Syndrome for both the prosecution and
the defence. Thus there were four levels of expert evidence ~ none, defence
only, prosecution only and both (where both a defence and a prosecution
expert gave evidence).

1

the Both experts, Retreat condition has been included in the Appendix, and the reader can
envisage the Defence only and prosecution only conditions on the basis of this sample
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The defence forensic psychologist gavr.: evidence describing the
characteristics of Battered Woman Syndrome and that in his opinion, the
defcndo:mt exhibited these characteristics, in that she did not have the capacity
to make decisions, she was very passive and dependent, had low self esteem
and feelings of shame about her situation. This expert opinion was based on

interviews which the psychologist had with the defendant following the
incident
The prosecution expert gave evidence that Batten· t Woman Syndrome
had been proposed, and briefly described the common characteristics which
have been purported to signifY the syndrome. However, this psychologist told
the court there was no empirical support for the proposed syndrome, and it was
nothing more than a collection of characteristics of a group of clients seen by
one psychologist. This evidence was included a!; it is feasible for the
prosecution to pre-empt the evidence which the defence may call.
Thus the evidence

pn~sented

in the Defence condition was specifically

related to the defendant, and was based on sessions between the psychologist
and the defendant, whereas the prosecudon expert evidence was in very
general tenns.

2.3.1.2 Retreat
The other variable, retreat, was such that in half of the transcripts (the

Retreat condition), the efendant had left her husband on three previous
occasions and stayed away for approximately 6 months each time, but

eventually returned, believing her husband's promises that he would not abuse
her again. In the other half (the No Retreat condition), the defendant, in exactly
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the same circumstances, had never lcli the rclutionship, und when challenged
by the prosecution lawyer about this, she stated she could not leave as she had
no resources to survive, and her husband had threatened to find and kill her if
she ever left him.
Battered Woman Syndrome was also used by the defence psychologist
to provide jurors with a framework within which to explore the issue of why
the defendant had or had not left the relationship on previous occasions. In the
retreat condition, the forensic psychologist for the defence told the court that to
leave and return was typical of the battered woman "psyche", and consistent
with such women's belief that their husband's promises not to hurt them again
are true- this ·J the proposed loving contrition phase of the cycle of violence.
In the no retreat condition, the defence psychologist told the jury that
the defendant did not have the ability to make decisions for herself, and that
learned helplessness had caused her to feel trapped in the relationship. Thus
the syndrome is able to provide reasons for behaviour in two very different
situations. The prosecution expert did not refer to the retreat aspect of the case.

2.3.2 Questionnaire
The questionnaires in the booklets contained the following questions:
• demographic details (sex, age, education, occupation, marital status);
• any prior jury experience;
• verdict for the case (choice of Guilty ofmurder I Guilty ofmanslaughter I

Not Guilty);
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of sentence they would impose (choice of none (let the defendant

go free) I Good Belwviour Bond (released on enterinJ; a bond to he of good
behaviourji>r a set amount of time) I Community based work IS'11.1pended
prison sentence (not served unless conditions outlined by the Court are
breached) I Prison sentence (to be served immediately) I Don't know);

• the length of sentence they would impose (interval scale ranging from I to
20 +years)- this was included to detennine the degree of punitiveness of
those participants who rendered a Guilty verdict and said a prison sentence
was the most appropriate punishment for the defendant;
• questions about the influence of specific aspects of the trial (such as the
extent to which BWS applied to the defendant, the degree to which the
defendant contributed to the abuse); and
• a section for general comments.

2.4 Procedure
Participants were instructed to read the transcript and complete the
questionnaire. They were asked not to re-read any aspects of the trial and to
complete the task in one sitting. The booklet was then put into a sealed
envelope and returned to the distributor, who then returned the completed
questionnaires to the researcher.
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Chapter 3 -Results and Discussion
3.1 Verdict
Participants had a choice of three categories of verdict: Guilty of
murder, Guilty of manslaughter. or Not Guilty. The frequency of responses for
each of these is shown in Table I as a function of gender of participant. This
response pattern is statistically significant:

x' ~ 12.44 (df~ 2), p< .01.

Table 1. Frequency distribution of verdict

Not Guilty

Guilty
(Manslaughter)

Guilty
(Murder)

Total

Male

43

30

7

80

Female

64

13

3

80

Total

107

43

10

160

Gender

Only 6% of participants (10 out of 160) found the defendant Guilty of murder.
Comparisons on the basis of such a small proportion would be meaningless, so
it is necessary to collapse the three categories into two. It is more logical to
combine the Guilty (manslaughter) and Guilty (murder) categories together, as
all participants rendering these verdicts are attributing the requisite blame and
intent to the accused. This can be distinguished from a Not guilty verdict
whore the participant is clearly attributing no liability on the defendant for the
alleged crime.
When the categories are collapsed in this way, it can be seen from
Table I that approximately two thirds of participants (67%, 107 out ofl60)
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asked about influences on their verdict) \...-ere somc,dut irh:On'>i-.,t•:nt v. ith the
quantitative findings; the reported influences

\~w·cre general[~

not retlcctt:d in

the verdicts rendered.

3.1.1 Certainty about verdict
Participants rated the degree of certainty with which they reached their
verdict on a scale of I - 7 (where I =not at all certain and 7 =completely
certain). It is interesting to note that those who rendered a verdict of :\ot
Guilty were far more certain about that decision than those who rendered a
verdict of Guilty (murder or manslaughter): 53% of those rendering a Not
Guilty verdict gave a rating of"completely certain" {a certainty rating of 7)
with respect to their decision. while only 28% of the Guilty group gave that

rating (X2 = 14.71, p< .001).

35

'

The efTeel of c~pcrt clo'idcncc pcr1nining tu Balttrcd Wonmn Syndrmnc un jur.1r

~';ridt~~

Table 2. Frequency distribution of certainty ratings ahout verdict

Verdict I
Certainty rating

Rating= 1-5
Male
Female

Rating= 6
Male
Female

Guilty
(Murder)

Not Guilty

Guilty
(Manslaughter)

16
2

15

12

8
4

I
2

5

10

20

6

Rating= 7
Male
Female

42

7
3

Total

107

43

15

0

Furthennore, females on the whole were more certain than males: 56%
of females gave a rating of"completely certain" (a certainty rating of 7) while
only 34% of males gave such a rating (X2 = 17.93, p<.OOl). It is also

interesting to note that within the Not Guilty group, females were more certain
of their decision than were males (X2 = 22.4, p<.OOl), but there were no
gender differences with respect to certainty in the Guilty (murder I
manslaughter) group.

3.1.2 Type of sentence imposed and punitiveness
Only 33% of participants (53 out of 160) rendered a Guilty
(manslaughter or murder) verdict. The seriousness which these participants
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attached to the defendant's actions is indicated by the type of sentence they felt
appropriate- 46 participants responded to this question, as shown in Table 3 as
a function of gender.

Table 3. Type of sentence as a function of sex of respondent and verdict
rendered

Verdict

Guilty
(Murder)

Guilty
(Manslaughter)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Total

none

0

0

I

I

2

good behaviour bond

0

0

3

2

5

community based work

I

0

3

0

4

prison sentence
(suspended)

2

2

15

4

23

prison sente!lce (to be
served immediately)

4

I

3

4

12

Total

7

3

25

II

46

Type of sentence

Of these 46 participants, 76% (35 out of 46) felt that some form of
imprisonment was the most appropriate sentence to be imposed. indicating the
seriousness with which the offence was judged. However, only 34% of those
participants (12 out of35) indicated that a prison sentence should be served
immediately; while the remaining 66% (33 out of35) felt that a suspended
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prison sentence was appropriate. The relatively high proportion of suspended
prison sentences may be a reflection of the need to punish with a reservation
that tll1s was a one-off situation which would nol recur.
It is also interesting to note that there were no gender differences in the
type of sentence imposed: 75% (24 out of32) of males who rendered a Guilty
(manslaughter or murder) verdict indicated that a prison sentence was
appropriate, while 79% (II out of 14) of females imposed such a sentence. (X2
~

O.DI5, p > .05).
A closer examination of Table 3 reveals findings contrary to what may

be expected. The prison sentences were not imposed only by those participants
who found the defendant guilty of murder: Only one of the five females who
would have sent the defendant to prison actually found her guilty of murder;
however, a far greater proportion of men who found the defendant guilty of
manslaughter would have ordered a suspended prison sentence (15 out of25)
than one to be served immediately (3 out of 25).
Only sixteen of the 38 participants who imposed a prison sentence
(suspended or immediate) indicated the length of sentence they felt to be
appropriate: the length imposed ranged from I to 21 years, with a mean of 7
years and a median of 5 years. This is a relatively lenient prison sentence for
murder, and suggests that those who indicated the appropriate ll'ngth of
sentence were not very punitive; this too may be reflective of the need for
punishment I general deterrence while recognising that it was probably a oneoff situation unlikely to recur.

38

'

The ctTcct uf ex pen e~il!cncc pcnainin~ to !lancrcd Wonwn Syn1hnmc 011 jurm ~eri•!tc,

3.2 Gender differences
As can be seen in Table I, there were sex differences in the overall
number of Not Guilty verdicts rendered. Females overall rendered more Not
Guilty verdicts than males (64 ver;us 43):

X'=

I 0.03, p < .01.

The finding of a higher acquittal rate for women than men is consistent
with those of Schuller (1992); Schuller and Hastings ( 1996); and Struik
(1996). It would seem that in this sample, males and females came to view a
case in which a battered woman has killed her partner from different
perspectives. This supports the findings of Reddy et al (I 997) concerning
differential attributions between men and women about domestic violence.
The mechanisms of these differences are unclear, particularly in light
of the equivocal findings in the psychological literature regarding gender
differences in verdicts in child sexual assault, rape and recovered memory
cases. However, they may be analogous with those studies which found that
male participants were more likely to find a male defendant Not Guilty in such
cases than female participants (eg. Crowley, O'Callaghan & Ball, 1994; Bull
Kovera, Levy, Borgida & Penrod, 1994; Gabora, Spanos & Joab, 1993; Clark

& Nightingale, 1997; Fischer, 1991; McNamara, Vattano & Viney, 1993).

3.3 Expert differences
The next question to consider is whether there were overall differences
across the four levels of expert evidence. Table 4 shows that there were no
statistically significant differences in the number of Not Guilty verdicts
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rendered across the tOur cxp1·rt conditions (X 2, =4.37, p> .05), although thl:rc
is a trend of more Not Guilty verdicts when there was only a defence expert
(X' = 2.99, p> .05). These findings arc contrary to those of Schuller ( 1992)
and Schuller and Hastings (1996) which found a lesser number of Guilty
verdicts for those participants receiving expert evidence than those not
receiving such evidence.

Table 4. Verdicts rendered by Expert

Verdict

Expert
Not Guilty

Guilty

Total

None

25

15

40

Defence only

32

8

40

Prosecution only

26

14

40

Both experts

24

16

40

Total

107

53

160

3.3.1 Degree of reliance on expert
The qualitative data about the degree of reliance placed on the expert
evidence by participants in this study serves to further explain the quantitative
fmding. Overall, 70% of participants gave a rating of l-4 on the 7-point scale
(where I= did not rely at all and 7 = relied completely) with respect to their
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reliance on the expert evidence. Thus participants in general did not place
much reliance on the expert evidence.
There were no gender differences with respect to reliance on the expert
evidence, however those males who gave a Not Guilty verdict relied more on
the expert than did those who gave a Guilty verdict (X 2 ~ I 3 .75, p<.OOJ ). !t
may be that the males who gave a Guilty verdict relied more on their preexisting beliefs about the situation. and were not swayed by the expert
evidence.
There was a significant difference in the degree of reliance placed on
the expert between the defence only and prosecution only conditions - those in
the defence only condition relied more on the expert than did those in the
prosecution condition (X2 ~ 12.58, p<.OOI). This may be because the defence
expert in the scenario had actually seen the defendant and was presenting
evidence favourable to her plight, whereas the prosecution expert merely
canvassed and refuted the validity of BWS in general terms.

3.3.2 Influence of"Battered Woman Syndrome"
There were no gender difference or differences based on the expert
condition with respect to participants' belief that BWS is a psychological
condition - the majority of participants (58%, 93 out of I 60) gave a rating of 57 (ie thought it was a psychological condition).
There were similar findings with respect to participants' belief that
BWS applied to the defendant- the majority of participants (61 %, 98 out of
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160) believed it did apply to her (ie. gave a rating of 5 • 7), and there were no
gender I expert condition dilTcrcnccs.
So in general terms, participants seemed to adhere to the existence of
BWS and its applicability to the defendant, but the expert evidence presenting
this information was generally not an influential factor in reaching their
verdict.

3.3.3 Concurrence of present findings with literature on BWS
The absence of any overall effect of expert evidence pertaining to BWS
on juror verdicts is an important finding with significant implications. Despite
much theoretical discussion about the utility and appropriateness of BWS
evidence, the results of this study suggest that there may not actually be any
utility of the evidence, an argument also proposed by McMahon (I 999).
Contrary to arguments that BWS is needed to dispel negative
preconceptions about battered women (eg. Beri, 1997; Gillespie, 1989;
Schneider, 1986; Schopp et al, 1994; Sheehy at al, 1992; Tarrant, 1990), the
results of this study suggest that any preconceptions that may have been held
by jurors were so strong that they were not altered by the introduction of
expert evidence pertaining to BWS. Alternatively, it may be that the high
acquittal rate is indicative of positive biases acting in the woman's favour (as
suggested by O'Donovan, 1993).
Furthennore, the fears that BWS would reinforce gendcred stereotypes
of passivity and helplessness (Brown, 1998; Stubbs & Tolmic, 1994 ), and that
BWS is needed to enable jurors to see the woman's behaviour as reasonable
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(Sheehy et al, 1992). were not borne out by these results. It is not possible to
ascertain ifjurors did view the woman in a stereotypical manner, but whnt is
important is that the introduction of any expert did not alter these views.
One possible explanation for finding

IHJ

effect or expert evidence is

that participants came to this task with their own strongly held views and
opinions about domestic violence and battered women. and were not receptive
to new I contrary infonnation provided in the fonn of expert evidence.
Another possible explanation is that the comprehensive coverage of the
facts contained in the transcript scenarios may have lessened the impact of the
expert evidence. The participants may have felt they did not need to rely on it,
and that they were better able to assess this evidence in light of the facts which
they already knew -the expert evidence may not have added anything further
to their picture.
The absence of any difference between the no expert and counter
expert conditions may be explained by Schuller and Hasting's (1989)
hypothesis that when faced with conflicting opinions about BWS.jurors may
return to their own set of beliefs about the situation.

3.4 Retreat differences
The third aspect to consider is whether there were differences in
verdicts rendered for the Retreat variable. As can be seen in Table 5, there
were no overall differences in the number of Not Guilty verdicts in the Retreat
condition compared to the No Retreat condition (54 versus 53)- X'~ 0.028,
p> .05. So whether the woman had previously left the deceased and returned to
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him, or always rcm<.~incd with him. had no cflCct on the overall number

or Not

Guilty judgments.
Table 5. Verdicts rendered by Retreat

Retreat

Verdict
Total
Not Guilty

Guilty

Retreat

54

26

80

No Retreat

53

27

80

Total

107

53

160

This is a curious finding, as differences would be expected between
these contrasting situations: It would be expected that if jurors were strictly
applying the law of self defence, there would be differentiation in verdicts
between a situation where a woman has left the relationship on previous
occasions, and one where she had not.
Martinson ( 1991) suggested that evidence about women's historical
and social constraints should be introduced through BWS for consideration by
the jury, as this would influence verdict. However the findings of this study
suggest that such factors may have no bearing on verdict.
The qualitative data regarding the retreat aspect for males is curious in
light of no differences being found in the quantitative data: Males in the
Retreat condition felt the defendant could have left the relationship
permanently, whereas males in the No Retreat condition did not think that the
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dcfCndant could leave the relationship. ·rhis difJCrcncc was statistically
significant (X 1 = 7.47, p<.OJ ). This docs not support thc quantitative finding
that whether the woman had Jell the relationship on previous occasion:; made
no difference to verdict. However, in light of this reported influence on
verdict, it seems that whether the defendant had left the relationship was at
least a factor in the decision of male participants, if only a minor consideration.

3.5 Interaction of Gender, Retreat and Expert
When the three independents variables of gender, retreat and e':pert are
considered together, it can be seen in Table 6 that there are no statistically
significant overall differences (X'= 6.46, d/f = 9, p >.05). Furthermore, taking
males and females separately does not reveal any differences within either of
the sex groupings (X'= 5.89 and X'= 0.54 respectively, d/f= 3, p>.05).
However, it is interesting to note that 7 of the 10 males who gave a
verdict of Guilty (Murder) were not exposed to any expert evidence (ie were in
the no expert condition). It may be that the mere introduction of expert
evidence for men reduced their tendency to find the defendant g-1ilty of
murder, and these men opted for the "middle ground" of a Guilty
Manslaughter verdict.
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Tnblt.! 6. Number of Not Guilty verdicts by expert, gender and retreat

Expert
Gender I
Retreat

Male
Retreat
No Retreat

Female
Retreat
No retreat

None

Defence
only

Prosecution
only

Both

3
7

9

5
6

7
2

7

9
10

8

6
9

8

4

7

3.6 Experimental Limitations
These findings must be limited to the facts of this particular case and
the details of the offence and the sample. As noted in Chapter Two (above),

tl:. :s ~ .unple did not match population demographics, particularly in relation to
education, and the ability to generalise from these results may thus be
somewhat limited. Furthennore, the nature of the task was not akin to a reallife jury trial: witnesses were not able to be assessed in vivo; and one
participant was making a decision about a hypothetical case on their own,
whereas an actual jury of twelve people considering a real murder case may
involve different dynamics. Another aspect to be noted is the motivation
required of the participants in this study- reading the transcript was a lengthy
process requiring a high degree of concentration and motivation. Although this
may be seen as a limitation, the actual trial situation would require far longer
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periods of concentration and greater motivation on the part of a juror to make
the correct decision on the ba'iis of all the evidence.
However, the dctailed evidence provided in the transcripts arc more
akin to the real-life courtroom situation than many other studies in this area
which simply provide jurors with a short paragraph describing a scene and
asking for a decision.
The manipulation may not have been strong enough to affect the
participants' fonnulated viewpoints: the sample may have been too small to
detect any differences; and it must be remembered that the data in this study is
categorical. Both of these factors reduce the power of the experiment- it is not
possible to conclusively say whether there was actually no clear effect of
expert evidence or whether the effect is simply not strong enough in the
community to be detected. through experimental manipulation. More research
utilising larger samples is needed in this important area to further explore the
influence of syndrome evidence on juror verdicts.
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Chapter 4- Conclusion
This research dispels many of the myths surrounding the utility and
impact of battered woman syndrome. The conclusion which can be drawn
from the present results is that expert evidence pertaining to BWS did not
influence juror verdicts, and that women in this sample were more likely to
acquit the accused woman than men, irrespective of the level of expert
evidence or the particular circumstances of the case.
The practical implications of this finding are significant. As discussed
above, the admissibility ofBWS in Australian courts appears to have been
done without adequate scientific scrutiny of its validity. The current findings
have ramifications for the further use of expert evidence pertaining to BWS. If
it does not have any actual effect on verdict, it would seem to be
counterproductive for the courts to continue endorsing its admissibility.
The expansion of the notion of reasonableness with respect to self
defence should be considered in light of these results. Although it is desirable
for the notion of reasonableness to be broadened, BWS is not the appropriate
vehicle by which to achieve this. Indeed, the feminist argument that BWS
provides a legitimate means for broadening juror's interpretation of what is
reasonable has not been borne out by the current results - there was no effect
found for the expert evidence.

It is submitted here that the courts need to recognise the limitations of
self defence in general, not merely with respect to battered women who kill
their partners. The notion of reasonableness should be a broad concept which
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docs not rcquin: extrinsic evident.:e to enable jurors to unnpn·hcmllhc
situation. Tl1c law ofsclfdc!Cncc slunJ]d he rcliJrmulated ''' int.:,Hp•,ratc
dynamics of ongoing emotional relationships when consiJering the
reasonableness of a defendant's actions. Imminent harm should he cxpantlcd to
include past and future threatened harm. and the taw should alo.;o an:ourH ](Jr
the lesser strength of some parties and recognise that such people olicn canno!
leave the relationship.
The broader implications of expanding the notion of reasonableness
must be considered and treated with caution: it is not dcsirablt: for the law lO
succumb to the complete individualisation of a crime or an offence, but a
compromise can and should be reached which allows greater flexibility in the

law of self defence.
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Juror verdicts in cases where a woman kills hcr_partnL'r: Explanation of
Research Project
Dear Participant,
Thankyou for agreeing to participate in this research. This study is
being conducted as part of my Master of Psychology (Forensic) degree at
Edith Cowan University. The research aims to investigate factors that
influence a juror in cases where a female defendant has killed her spouse.
Before you begin, l would ask that you carefully read the following
information. lfyou fully understand it and then agree to participate, please
sign the consent form which follows this letter prior to beginning the task. This
is a requirement which my university ethics committee insists on for all
research conducted, and it simply ensures that you agree to p3rticipatc in the
research of your own free will. When the questionnaire is returned to me, this
form will be removed from it and kept separately to ensure your
confidentiality. The only person besides me who will sec the form and your
responses is my supervisor, Professor Don Thomson.
The time required to complete the task varies from individual to
individual, but on average it should take approximately 50 minutes. It must be
completed while you arc alone and in one sitting, so please ensure you arc able
to complete the task uninterrupted. Please do not discuss it with anyone until
you have completed the task.
There are instructions for you to follow throughout the booklet. You
will have to read a summary of a murder trial in which a woman was charged
with killing her spouse. Once you have read this, please put it to one side and
do not refer to it again. You then return a verdict on the defendant, answer
some questions about the case and provide some details about yourself.
Some people may find parts of this material disturbing. If you think
you may be upset by reading such a case please feel free to decline to
participate. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and if you do agree to
participate you are free to withdraw at any stage or to decline to complete any
part ofthe material.
All information that you provide will remain confidential and no
individual will be identifiable from the reported data. You will not be asked
for your name on the questionnaire but some personal details on age, gender,
education and employment or area of study will be required so that meaningful
conclusions can be drawn from the research.
When reading through the booklet, please read each page in the order it
is presented- please DO NOT skip over any pages or jump ahead in your
reading of the information, It is presented in the following order to ensure
consistency between respondents. Once you have completed the booklet,
please return only the questionnaire and consent fonn to your distributor in the
enclosed envelope. The material will then be returned to mt: in the envelope.
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Should you lwvl: any concl:rns or unre.solvcd qLwstions rl:garding this
project, or if you an: intcrcslt.!d in the results, ph:asc fed free to contact m~.: or
my University supt.:rvisor, Professor Don Thomson, at tlw above address. Ir
you would preli:r to include any questions and a return address in the spaCL'
provided at the end of your booklet, I will he hnppy to answer such questions
for you.
Thankyou for your participation.
Yours sincerely,
Clare Shannon.
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iliffientJix B. Consent limn lh!:...lli!.rticipants

Juror verdicts in cases where a woman kills her partner
Consent fonn, Masters in Psychology (Forensic)

I,

(Name)

agree to take part in the research being conducted by Clare Shannon as part
requirement for a Master's thesis at Edith Cowan University. I have read the
explanatory statement which explains this project in sufficient detail and I fully
understand all that is required of me. I understand that this research is being
conducted in accordance with guidelines set down by the Edith Cowan
University Ethics Committee for the conduct of ethical research involving
human par!icipants. I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the
study at any time and that all information I supply will be treated as strictly
confidential.
Signed ............................................................... .

Date ....................... .

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTiCIPATION.
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Appendix C. Sample transcript: Both experts 1 Retreat condition
The Queen v Forre.\·ter

All names and idcntil)dng fcnturcs in this transcript have been changed to
ensun: pnvncy.
Presiding Judge: Her Honour Samantha Wade.
Prosecution lawyer: Mr Jones
Defence lawyer: Mrs Smith
Introduction
Rosemary Forrester was charged with the murder of her husband Gerald and
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The following is a transcript of her Trial.
Please read this in one sitting~ reading and answering the questions will take
approximately one hour. Please read this through without returning to previous
pages once they have been read. While reading, try to imagine that you are a
juror who has to decide the verdict in this case. Once you have read the
summary, you will be asked to give a verdict and answer some questions.
Prosecution lawyer's opening address
MR JONES: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is my intention to prove to
you, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Rosemary Forrester murdered her
husband. It will be shown that she stabbed to death her husband of fifteen
years while in the middle of an argument and physical fight. You will hear
evidence from a Pathologist that Mrs Forrester inflicted five stab wounds to
her husband's chest and abdomen which led to his death. Senior Constable
Franck of the Police Service will give evidence that Mrs Forrester admitted to
her that she had killed her husband and that she knew that her actions at the
time were wrong. Evidence will be led from a forensic psychologist that
although there may be psychological explanations offered for why Mrs
Forrester acted in this way, such explanations have not been adequately
substantiated by scientific evidence. We will ask you to conclude from this that
Mrs Forrester acted in a rational manner when she took the life of her husband.
The issue of provocation or self defence may be raised by the defence, but we
will show that Rosemary Forrester intentionally murdered her husband. The
totality of the evidence will demonstrate to you beyond reasonable doubt that
the crime of murder has been committed.
HER HONOUR: Mr Jones would you call your first witness.
MR JONES: Yes Your Honour, I call Dr William Thomas.
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Dr Thomns, forensic

patholo~ist

MR JONES: Is rour jill/name William Edward 71uHna.\<1 ........ Yes.
What are your qual{/h·tllions? ........ I have a mcdicul degree from the
University of Wastmvn, I completed the pathology training program at the
Sou twas hospital, I am a member of the Fellowship of the Royal College of
Pathologists, and have been working as a forensic pathologist fOr thirty years.
And you are a j(Jrensic patholo~ist \Vith the Western A ustra/ian Forensic
Laboratories? ...... Yes.
How long have you been in that position? ........ I have held that position for
fifteen years.
Did you perjiJrm an autopsy on Gerald Smith on the 8th November 1996?
........ Yes.
What was the time of death? ........ Mr Forrester died at 12.17 am on the 7th
November 1996.
Could you describe the fatal injuries which you found? ........ There were five
main injuries, stab wounds, to the body- three on the front of the chest and
two on the front of the abdomen.
And what was the cause ofdeath in your opinion? .......... The stab wound
which caused death was one to the chest area which penetrated ten centimetres
through the heart and aorta. An injury such as this would cause a rapid death.
MR JONES: That completes my examination of the witness, Your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Would you like to cross-examine this witness Mrs Smith?
MRS SMITH: Yes Your Honour. Dr Thomas, did you find any internal
damage on Mr Forrester's autopsy? ......... Yes, Mr Forrester was found to
have extensive liver damage which was probably caused by excessive alcohol
consumption.

Did you conduct tests on samples of blood taken from the body? Yes, the
blood alcohol level present in Mr Forrester when he was killed was 0.15.

I have no further questions for this witness Your Honour.
HER HONOUR: You are excused Dr Thomas. Would you call your next
witness Mr Jones.
MR JONES: I call Senior Constable Franck.
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Senior Constable Francl{
MR JONES: Would you please state yourfitll name and rank ......... Sarah
Louise Franck, I am a senior constable of police stationed at Warrenvalc.
On the 7th Novemher /996 ar 12 30 am did you receive a plume-cal/ a/the
police .\·tation'! ......... Yes I n:ct.:ivcU a eall from a woman, whnrn I now know
to be Rosemary Forrester. She to!U me that she had just killed ht:r hushand.
Did you subscquemiy attend at the address given by this \WJmcm'! ........ Ycs, I
attended at 25 Sorrow Way, Warren vale at 12.43 a.m. with my partner, Senior
Constable Simmons.
Would you please tel/ the Court what happened v.:hen you arrived at this
address ........ My partner and I entered the house through the back door and
walked into the kitchen. There we found cutlery and crockery strewn all over
the kitchen, and Mrs Forrester was huddled next to the body ofht.:r deceased
husband weeping quietly.
What did you say to 1\t/rs Forrester? ........ I asked her what her name was, and
she replied "Rosemary Forrester".! asked her if she was the woman who had
rung the Warrenvale police station and reported a killing, and she replied
"Yes". I then asked her what had happened. She said "I killed him .... We had
a fight and I stabbed him". I asked her where the knife was and she pointed to
a spot on the floor just next to the body. I asked her if that was the knife she
used to kill her husband and she replied "Yes".
And what happened after that? ........ Mrs Forrester was read her rights and
taken to the police station where a Record of Interview was conducted. The
interview commenced at 2.15 am and lasted half an hour. The interview had to
be stopped on three occasions because Mrs Forrester became distressed and
requested a break.
MR JONES: I would now like to play the tape of the Record oflnterview to
the Court Your HoPour.
HER HONOUR: Yes, certainly Mr Jones.
Record of Interview:
S/C FRANCK: This is a tape-recorded interview between Senior Constable
Franck, and Rosemary Forrester. The date is 8 November 1996, and the time is
2.15 am.
What is your full name? ........ Rosemary Forrester.

The first thing I must do is read you your rights ........ You have the right to
legal representation. You do not have to say anything, but anything you do say
can be used as evidence in a Court of Law. Do you understand these rights?
........ Yes.
Do you wish to exercise any of these rights? ........ No.
What is you date of birth? ........ 9th November 1960.
Where do you live? ........ 25 Sorrow Way, Warrcnvale.
Did you live there with your husband Gerald Forrester? ........ Yes.
Can you please tell me what happened yesterday. the 7th November 1996?
........ Gerald had been drinking all afternoon, following a bad gambling loss
this morning. Soon after he came home, he started yelling at me, abusing me,
calling me awful names, and blaming me for his losses this morning. He told
me that if! didn't prepare a perfect meal for dinner, then he would kill me
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........ I w:1s

scan.:d. hut went to the h.itr.:hcn to start preparing dinner. lie
caml! in alkr a fcw minutes and startcd hitting rill: over thL' l~t:;td wnh his lists.
Whi\1.! he was dning this he \\i!S ~alling me an u~ly mole and a '>lupid •.!ut
......... llc kept calling lilt: tht:sc nanh..·s while wt.: \\'cn.: eal!ng dinmT
:fnd what hll[!fl<'lll'd u/ier dinnt·r·' . ...... Alicr dinner ht: lm.:kt:d me in ;t
Sll

cupboard. I dlln't knm\ hnw long I \I, aS Ill thcrc ..... Ill: opt:tH.:d the dour at onc
stage. and urinatt:d on me. lie said that I dt:":-.erved tlw; h~:r.:athe I hadn't rut
dessert forks onthl..' table \\hen I set it fnr Jinnt.:r. ...... I mu-,t ha\l: het.:n in the
cupboard l~1r hour'i, but I Jnn't knnw c:-..a~.:tly how long ........ Whcn h~: IOlJk me
out of there. ht: h.cpt ydling at me and calling me a whore- I was cr::.·in::; and
begging him to slOp it, but he \\Ou!dn't. and anything I said ju<>t s~.:em~.:d to
make him angrier. ........ l-k push~.:d rm: arounJ tht.: houst.:. and into the
bathroom, where Ill!' tit.:d my \Hists to the hath laps, and forced me to ha\'t.: sex
with him- I didn't want to do this, and it \\as very painful ....... I 1~.: just kt.:pt
laughing the whole time, and called me a fat ugly mole ....... When ht: had
finished he ordered me to get into the sho\ver ........ I had my shm\er and th~.:n
went into the bedroom to put some clothes on ........ I don't know\\ ht:re hc \V<lS
at the time. I tried to get out th~.: window of our bedroom ....... Just a~ I got the
fly-screen off though. he came in ........ I \\as so frightened and kept begging
him not to hurt me ....... But he didn't listen ....... .
And what happened then? ........ He dragged me by the hair into the kitchen and
told me to start making him s0me dessert ........ he stayed in the kitchen the
whole time, tomlCnting me with nasty names ........ After a while he started
waving a knife at me, and kept doing this the whole tim(' I was making dessert
.... this probably lasted about half an hour or more ........ He \vas waving the
knife in my face, saying that my dessert had better be p~.:rfect or I'd be dt:Jd
........ He went to go to the toilet, and l grabbed another knife from the drawer
and held it under the bench so that ht: couldn't see it ....... \Vhen he came back
into the kitchen, he came up behind me and put his knife under my throat ....... .
He said something about taking me to the bathroom and giving rne what I
deserved ..... I just thrust my knife up and behind me .... it must hJve got him,
because he staggered backwards ...... I wc111 after him and just kept stabbing
him until he stopped moving ........ I don't know why I did it- I was just so

scared that he would kill me .... I didn't mean to kill him.
And what did you do next? ........ I don't know how long I was on

th~: floor for,

but after some time I rang the police and told them what had happ(•ned ....... .
the next thing I remember is that the police arrived and I was brought here to
the station for this interview.
Why did you kill your husband? ..... I didn't mean to kill him ...... I just wanted
to stop him hurting me ...... Because I was scared that if I didn't stop him

somehow, then he would kill me.
Had your husband behaved in a similar way towards you on prcvio11s
occasions? ......... Yes, Gerald had been abusing me for the last twelve years.
Are you aware that what you did was wrong? ........ Yes.
SIC FRANCK: Interview concluded at 2.43 a.m.
MR JONES: That concludes Senior Constable Franck's evidence in chief Your
Honour.
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HER HONOUR: Thank you Mr Jones. Mrs Smith, do you have any questions
for this witness?
MRS SMITH: No 1ank-you Your Honour.
HER HONOUR: '/cry well, you arc excused Senior Constable Franck. Would
you call your next witness Mr Jones.
MR JONES: I call Rebecca Hathaway.

Ms Hathaway, forensic psychologist
MR JONES: Would you please state your full name and qualifications to the
Court ........ Rebecca Saily Hathaway. [have a Masters degree in forensic
psychology from the University ofSoundler, and I have been working as a
forensic psychologist for twelve years.
Do you specialise in any particular cli~nl group? ........ Yes, [ have structured
my practice so that I specialise in dealing with women who have been
involved in abusive relationships.
Are you aware ofthe psychological condition called "Battered Woman
,
v
syndrome .. .........
1 es.
Are you able to tell the Court about this syndrome? ........ Battered Woman
Syndrome has been proposed by an American psychologist, Dr Lenore
Walker. Dr Walker claims that the syndrome describes the symptoms and
common characteristics of many women who are subjected to abuse from their
husband I partner. Dr Walker proposes that a woman with Battered Woman
Syndrome is subjected to three stages of violence. Stage one (Tension
building), where there is minor physical abuse; stage two (the acute battering
incident), which is a climax of stage one and results in a severe battering; and
stage three (loving contrition), where the barterer is remorseful and sorry and
promises that the abuse will never happen again. Dr Walker proposes that each
time the cycle is repeated, the violence becomes more severe. The definition of
a battered woman is one who has been through the cycle of violence at least
twice.
Is there another aspect to the syndrome? ........ Yes, Dr Walker also proposes
that women who have this syndrome suffer from something known as learned
helplessness, whereby they become unable to make decisions for themselves,
they lose all confidence in their ability to cope with every day life, and they are
unable to leave the abusive relationship .... In effect they have learnt to be
helpless as a result of the physical and psychological abuse they have received
from their partner.
In your opinion, do the characteristics proposed by Dr Walker constitute a
syndrome? ........ No.
Why do you say this? ........ Dr Walker is wrong to claim that a common set of
characteristics seen in a number of clients constitutes a psychological
syndrome which can predict and explain certain behaviours on the part of all
women abused by their partner.
Do you accept this as a valid scientific phenomenon? ........ No. Dr Walker's
methodology was not experimentally sound ........ She simply interviewed a
number of women who had been abused, and, based on this qualitative-data,
proposed a syndrome without having it subjected to scientific scrutiny. To my
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knowledge there has been no research addressing the proposed theory which
could justify it being called a "syndrome" ...... There arc dangers inherent in
rigidly classifying any person's reaction to a given situation, which is what Dr
Walker's Battered Wonwn Syndrome runs the risk of doing.
Could you please state to the Court wh_v you think Dr Walker's exp.'anations
for Buttered Woman Syndrome are umenahle? ........ I have three reasons.

Firstly, there has not been any research, to my knowledge, which has tested the
claims she makes. Until this has been done, it should not, and cannot be
accepted that all battered women behave this way ...... one cannot conclude
that all women who have been abused will exhibit these characteristics.
Secondly, even if Dr Walker's observations could be replicated, it would still
have to be established that all women subjected to the abuse cycle who have
killed their husbands also exhibit the characteristics of Battered Woman
Syndrome. Thirdly, it would need to be established why it is that many
women who exhibit the characteristics of Battered Woman Syndrome, being
the cycle of violence, the learned helplessness and perceived inability to
escape, and the perception that the only way to escape from the situation is to
kill their partner, do NOT in fact kill their husbands.
Have you heard ofany psychological explanations being advanced for
particular behavioural of battered women? ........ Yes. I have heard Battered

Woman Syndrome being offered as an explanation for women killing their
partners. But I have a problem with this.
Do you see a connection between a woman who suffers from Battered Woman
Syndrome killing her husband? ........ No.I see a large inconsistency in

someone who suffers from learned helplessness turning around and becoming
a cold blooded killer.
MR JONES: I have no further questions your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Mrs Smith do you wish to cross-examine this witness?
MRS SMITH: Thank you Your Honour ........ Ms Hathaway, in your
experience, do many of the women who have been abused by their partners
exhibit commotl characteristics? ........ Yes.
In your opinion as a scientist, what constitutes a syndrome? ........ A syndrome

is regarded as being identifiable when a collection of symptoms occurs
together so often that they provide a recognisable clinical entity.
Does not Dr Walker's Battered Woman Syndrome meet these criteria ofa
syndrome? ........ She has described common characteristics in a sample of

battered women. But that does not mean that this small sample can be used to
explain the behaviour of the whole population of battered women, as Dr
Walker claims.
MRS SMITH: I have no further questions Your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Thankyou Ms Hathaway, you are excused. Mr Jones, would
you call your next witness please.
MR JONES: That is the end of the case for the Prosecution Your Honour.
HER HONOUR. Mrs Smith, are you going to present evidence on behalf of
your client?
MRS SMITH: Yes Your Honour, if I may first open the case for the defence?
HER HONOUR: Yes, go ahead Mrs Smith.
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Defence lawyer•s opening address
MRS SMITH: Members of the jury, it is the responsibility of the Crown to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that my client, Rosemary foorrcster is guilty of
murder. The defence is not obliged to present any evidence to dispute this. As
stated by the learned Prosecutor, there is no argument that my client killed her
husband. What is in dispute is the circumstances in which she killed him. The
defence will present evidence to show you that Rosemary Forrester killed her
husband in self defence, in defence of her life- she feared for her life after
many years of abuse and intimidation from her husband. You wi!! hear
evidence from Rosemary Forrester about the abuse she endured throughout the
fiil:een years of her marriage to Gerald Forrester. You will hear from a forensic
psychologist that Rosemary Forrester was suffering from "Battered Woman
Syndrome", an established psychological condition. Women suffering from
this have been shown to have certain characteristics which lead to behaviour
that may not otherwise be understood by the ordinary person. We will show
that Rosemary Forrester was in fear of her life for ma.ny years, and was acting
in self defence of her life when she took that of her husband. She should be
acquitted of murder.

Mrs Forrester, defendant.
MRS SMITH: Could you please tel/the court your full name ........ Rosemary
Forrester.
And you were married to the victim, Gerald Forrester? ........ yes.
Could you tell the Court about your marriage ........ I married Gerald in 1982,
when I was twenty five and he was twenty eight. The first two years of our
marriage were the happiest years of my life ..... Gerald was a wonderful, loving
husband who was very romantic and thoughtful towards me. We were both
working at the time and had big plans to buy a house and have children.
Did things change after the first two years ofmarriage? ........ Yes, after the
first two years of our marriage, Gerald began to verbally abuse me. He would
call me an ugly mole, and accuse me of being a slut. From then on his
behaviour became increasingly abusive and frightening. I was surprised when
it first happened, but believed that it was just a phase that Gerald was going
through, and that everything would soon be back to normal ... I didn't know
how wrong that belief was.
Could you describe some of this verbal abuse which you suffered in the first
few years ofyour marriage to Gerald ........ He often told me that I had grown
very ugly and that I should not leave the house because people would find me
too unpleasant to look at ... He sometimes held a knife to my throat and
forced me to look in a mirror and repeat statements like, "I am a W'.::rthless
animal who deserves to be treated like a beast". He often called me stupid and
would cuff me over the head. Occasionally he would hit me more seriously,
and this would leave me with bruises. This went on for the rest of our
marriage, and the physical violence became much worse as the years went by.
And can you tell the Court what happened after the first five years ofyour
marriage? ........ Well, it was at about this time that I was retrenched from my
job. I wanted to look for another job, but Gerald told me that he didn't want me
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to work .. He said that I was too stupid and that no-one would want to employ
me. He said thnt i rJ did get a job he would come and tell my boss that! was a
prostitute who didn't deserve "honest" work ... So I didn't look for another
job, and haven't had a job since then ..... It was at about this time that I decided
it would be better if I didn't have children, because I was af'raid of what Gerald
might do to them.
Could you pleuse tell us ahout the ph_vsical violence which you suffered at the
hands ofyour husband ........ The physical violence became worse over time
and was never predictable or continuous. There were periods without physical
violence, but when it happened it became more severe with each episode.
Gerald would go into a rage over very minor things, like having a crooked
knife on the table or a small crease in his :hirt. He expected me to be a slave to
his every whim. I lived my life "walking on eggshells", not knowing when or
how Gerald would be violent. His violence was worse when he drank, and he
was drinking more than ever towards the end.
Could you please give the Court some specific examples ofyour husband's
behaviour towards you? ........ He often made me sit inside a small dark
cupboard for hours. l-Ie said once that the reason for this was that I didn't have
enough spare jars of manna lade in the cupboard. He sometimes forced me to
come into the bathroom and sit on the floor while he had a bath. He would ask
me questions and, if he didn't like my answers, he would splash me with water.
Did your husband ever threaten to kill you? ........ Yes, often.
Could you give us an example of this? ........ One day I had been out shopping,
which is the only reason that Gerald ever let me leave the house without him. I
was unpacking the bags in the kitchen when Gerald came in. He just stood
there watching me unpack everything. Then he asked where the caviar was.
We never ate caviar, so I was surprised that he asked, and said that to him. He
got this look in his eye, came over and grabbed me around the neck. He said
"If you ever question my authority again, I'll kill you you stupid woman".
How did this make you feel? ........ This made me terrified. I really believed that
Gerald was capable of carrying out his threats one day.
Is it fair to say that you often felt in fear ofyour life? ........ Yes, l was
frightened of what he would do to me every single day ..... I was often too
scared to go to sleep before he had ..... I would lie in bed listening to every
movement he made, and wouldn't let myself sleep until I heard him snoring.
Did you ever tell anyone about the abuse? ........ No.
Why didn't you tell anyone about the abuse? ........ I felt very isolated and often
ashamed ofmyself.l couldn't tell anyone because I was too embarrassed to
admit to it. I used to brush off enquires about bruises and scratches by saying
that I had fallen or scratched myself.
Did you ever have to go to hospital as a result ofabuse inflicted by your
husband? ........ Yes, three times.
And did you stay in hospital until you were fully recovered on any ofthese
occasions? ........ No. The first two times I was admitted to hospital, Gerald
forced me to leave the hospital after two days, which was before the doctors
had discharged me. The other time, which happened one week before this
business, l 'd been so severely kicked in the stomach that I had to be admitted
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to hospital. Gerald took me to the hospital and left me there, saying that if!
didn't return within three hours he would drag me home and give rne a "good
belting". I was so frightened of what he might do ifl didn't obey him, so I
returned home as soon as the doctors had treated my injuries.
Did your husband everj(Hce you to do things n·hich you Jidn 't want to do'!
........ Yes, Gerald often forced me to engage in sexual acts which I didn't want
to do. His favourite was to hold me by the hair and force me to perform oral
sex by pulling my head back\vards and fof'.Vards on his penis. He would
sometimes tic my wrists to the bed head and have sex with me despite me
begging him not to.
Did you ever leave your husband for an extended period of time, with the
intention of never returning to him? ........ Yes, I left him three times. The first
time was after five years of marriage. I stayed away three months but had to go
back because I didn't have a job or any money or support .... I was completely
dependent on Gerald for money ....... The next two times I left I stayed away
for six months each time. But Gerald eventually found out where I was living,
and would come and beg me to return. He kept promising he would never hurt
me again ....... I had no money, and eventually returned to him, on the
condition that he would stop drinking and abusing me. f believed his promises,
and that he would change this time ... that "promise" lasted all of about three
days on both occasions ... I didn't have the emotional or financial resources to
leave him again.
Were there times when he was not violent towards you? ........ Yes. Usually
after a really bad incident ........ Gerald would sometimes bring flowers home
for me, and would tell me how sorry he was and how much he loved me. He
would promise that he would never do it again.
Did you believe your husband when he said these things? ........ Yes. Each time
it happened, I believed him when he said it would be the last. And then things
would be fine for a few days or a few weeks, sometimes even a few months.
But then he would "snap" again, and the violence would start all over.
Could you please tell the Court again what happened on the 7th November
1996......... Gerald had been at the horses all day, drinking himself stupid.
When he came home, he started yelling at me, and told me it was my fault he
lost at traces. He threatened to kill me if I didn't make him a perfect dinner. He
came into the kitchen after a while, and started hitting me over the head, and
calling me awful names. When we had had dinner he locked me in the
cupboard. I don't know for how long.
Did he do anything to you while you were in the cupboard? ........ Yes, he
opened the door at one time and urinated on me. He told me that was because I
didn't put forks for dessert on the table ..... .
What happened when he eve?;tually let you out of the cupboard? ........ He was
yelling at me, calling me a slut, mole, whore ... I was crying and begging him
to stop, but he kept going. Whatever I would say to him seemed to make him
much more angry. He started pushing me all over the place, and finally got me
into the bathroom ...
What happened in the bathroom? ..... he tied my wrists to the bath taps, and had
sex with me. It hurt a lot, and kept begging him to stop - I didn't want him to
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do this, but he kept going, tllll; 1aughing the who!~ time, still calling me n;uncs.
After that he told me to clean up in the shower ....
What did you do after your shower? ...... I went to the bedroom to put some
clothes on .... I tried to open the wimbw, to get out the housc and away
form him, because I was really scared of what he might do to me. But he came
in as In was taking the llyscrcen ofT ... I was so frightened of what he was
going to do next ... I was begging him not to hurt me, but he wasn'tlistening to
me.
What did he do to you? ..... He took me by the hair and dragged me into the
kitchen. He was still yelling at me, and told me I had to make some dessert for
him ..... While I was doing this, he was calling me names.
Did he do anything else ro you while you were in the kitchen? ........ Yes. He
started waving a knife at me, and he was saying that if the dessert wasn't
perfect, then he'd kill me ... At one stage he went to go to the toilet, and I
grabbed a knife from the drawer ... He came back into the kitchen and stood
behind me. He put the knife under my throat and said something about taking
me into the bedroom and giving me what I deserved ... I then thrust the knife
up and behind me .... I guess it got him, because he staggered backwards and
there was blood coming from his stomach o.rea ..... I went after him and kept
stabbing him .. When he stopped moving I collapsed on the floor.
And what did you do next? .... I don't know how long after this, but I rang the
police and told them what I'd done. I remember the police arriving and being
taken to the police stai.ion for the interview.
Could you tell the Court why you killed your husband? ........ I don't know why
I did it ... I was scared that if! didn't kill him, then he would kill me, as he had
said that night and so many times before.
MRS SMITH: I have no more questions for Mrs Forrester Your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Thankyou Mrs Smith. Mr Jones, do you wish to cross
examine?
MR JONES: Yes Your Honour ........ Mrs Forrester ....
You said you left your httsband because he abused you? ........ Yes, that's right.
And you returned to him? ........ Yes, but .......
Mrs Forrester, I suggest that you voluntarily discharged yourselffrom
hospital on the three occasions because you wanted to return to your husband
and make up with him as soon as possible ........ No, f returned home because I
was afraid for my safety if I didn't return.
I suggest that on the occasion one week before the killing, you discharged
yourselffrom the hospital because you wanted to get rid ofyour husband ........
No ...... That is not true. I discharged myself from hospital because my
husband had threatened to drag me out of there and give me a "good belting" if
I didn't return home within three hours.
You didn't really suffer all ofthe abuse that you have told the court about
today did you Mrs Forrester? ........ That's not true. I suffered all of it, and
more.
1 sugge~·t that the reason you killed your husband was because you didn't have
the ability to leave him, and couldn't think ofany other way to get rid of him
........ That's not true .... 1 killed him because I was afraid fro my own life.

or
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MR JONES: I have no further questions Your llonour.
HER HONOUR: Thunkyou Mrs Forrester, could you return to the dock please.
Mrs Smith do you have any more witnesses?
MRS SMITH: Yes Your llonour, I call Thomas Rogers.

Mr Rogcrs 1 Mcdic~tl Records officer.
MRS SMITH: Would you please state your full name and occupation ....... .
Thomas Stanley Rogers. I am the Medical Records Officer at Winrath
Hospital.
Do you hare the hospital records which were subpoenaed to Court concerning
Mrs Rosemary Forrester? ........ I do.
Do those records indicate that Airs Forrester was admitted to Winrath
Hospital on three separate occasions? ........ Yes they do. Mrs Forrester was
admitted to hospital on the 18th July 1986, the 25th September 1990 and the
31st October !996.
And do those records provide information about her discharge from hospital?
........ Yes, in all three cases, it says that the patient discharged herself from
hospital against the advice of her treating physician.
MRS SMITH: Thankyou Mr Rogers. I have no further questions Your
Honour.
HER HONOUR: Mr Jones?
MR JONES: Thankyou Your Honour. Mr Rogers, do those records have any
indication as to the reasons for Rosemary Forrester discharging herselfon
these three occasions before her doctor advised her to? ........ No, they simply
say that she left before the doctor advised it.
So you are not able to tell the court if it was Mrs Forrester or someone else
who decided that she should leave the hospital? ........ That is correct - I am
unable to say why she left the hospital.
MR JONES: Yes, thankyou Mr Rogers. No further questions your Honour.
HER HONOUR: You are excused mr Rogers. Mrs Smith, would you call your
next witness please.
MRS SMITH: I call Katrina Roberts.

Ms Roberts, Forensic Psychologist
MRS SMITH: Would you please state your full name and qualifications to the
Court ........ Katrina Simone Roberts. I have a Masters degree in Forensic
Psychology from the University of Millath, and I have been working as a
psychologist for twelve years.
Do you specialise in any particular client group? ........ Yes, I see mainly
women who have been involved in abusive relationships with a husband or
partner.
Are you aware of the psychological condition called "Battered Woman
synd rome "?......... 1v es.
Are you able to tell the Court about this syndrome? ........ "Battered Woman
Syndrome" was proposed by an American psychologist, Dr. Lenore Walker in
!979. A battered woman is defined as one who is repeatedly subjected to
forceful physical or psychological behaviour by another person.
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Is there any theoretical hasisJin· this syndrome? ........ Yes, Dr. Walker has
used research to come up with two theories to explain the Battered Woman
Syndrome. The tirst, l~.:arned helplessness, dt:scribes a psychological condition
tirst tested by Sdigrnan and his colleagues in whith dogs were taught that thdr
behaviour did not make a dif!Crem:e to whether or not they received dt:ctric
shocks. Dr. Walker has found that battered women suffi.:r from the same
distortions in perception. A battered women often believes that no-one can
help her. The second theory, the cycle of violence, has been verified by other
researchers. There arc three phases to this cycle. Firstly, a phase of tension
building, leading up to the second phase \vhich is the acut~ battering incident,
followed by a third phase, \vhich is a period or loving contrition, or at lca"t a
cessation of the violent behaviour. To meet the criteria for BWS, a woman
must have been involved in the cycle of violence described by Dr. Walker at
least twice.
In your opinion, does the Battered Woman Syndrome have scientific validity?
....... Yes. It is accepted in the psychological community as constituting a
syndrome .... Research conducted by colleagues of Dr. Walker (trained
psychologists) of situations of domestic violence have revealed typical patterns
of behaviour on the part of the female victim.
What are some results of the research which has been conducted! ........ It has
been shown that women who have suffered habitual domestic violence are
typically affected psychologically. Repeated acts of violence, alternating very
often with phases of kindness and loving behaviour, commonly leave the
battered woman in the psychological condition of learned helplessness, which
I described above ........ The battered woman can't predict or control the
occurrence of acute outbreaks of violence and often clings to the hope that the
kind and loving phase~ will become the norm. This is often reinforced by
financial dependence, children and feelings of guilt. The battered woman
rarely seeks outside help because of fears of further violence ... It is not
uncommon for such women to experience feelings for their mate which the
women describe as love. There is often an all pervasive feeling that it is
impossible to escape the dominance and violence of their partner. There is a
sense of constant fear with a perceived inability to escape the situation.
Did you see Rosemary Forrester following the incident in question? ........ Yes,
I saw her on eight occasions.
Did you come to any conclusion about her psychological state? ........ Yes, in
my opinion Rosemary Forrester was svffcring from "Battered Woman
Syndrome".
What made you come to this conclusion? ........ Mrs Forrester exhibited several
symptoms consistent with those cited in the literature: She told me that she felt
trapped in the relationship and that she was unable to leave pennanently for
fear of retaliation from her husband if he found her.
Can you say anything about the fact that Nfrs Forrester sujj"cred form battered
Woman Syndrome, and the fact that she killed her husband? ........ In my
opinion, Mrs Forrester exhibited symptoms consistent with Battered Woman
Syndrome- she was terrified of her husband, and in constant fear of her life. I
believe that she killed her husband because she felt that her life was in danger
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if she did not. In essence, she was acting to dc!Cnd herselragainst behaviour
which shl! thought he husband was capable
behaviour towards her.
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based on his history of abusive

Is th.:re any cxp.'anationjiw Mrs Forrester returniiiR to her lwshmul on the
th,.ee occasions that she had /eji him in the past? ........ The J;H.:t that Mrs

Forrester had returned to her husband alicr leaving him on three separate
occasions is consistent with a typical ''battered woman psyche". B<Jttcrcd
women truly bdicvc that their husband will not harm tlwm again ·this is in
fact the tina! phase of the cycle of battering (\vherc the womnn believes that
her husband will not abuse her again) which is rcpcated over and over. Mrs
Forrester truly believed that her husband would not hurt her again.
MRS SMITH: Thank you Ms Roberts. I have no further tjUestions Your
Honour.
HER HONOUR: Mrs Smith, would you like to cross examine the witness.
MR JONES: Yes Your Honour. lvfs Roberts, is the "Batrered Woman
Syndrome" a recognised psychiatric condition? ........ Battered woman
syndrome is not a recognised condition listed in the psychiatric classification
system (DSM·IV), but it is referreU to in many psychiatric texts.
I suggest to you that the "Bauered Woman Syndrome" is not so recognised
because it has not been subjected to any rigorous scientific scrutiny........ I

disagree with that. As I said earlier, Dr Walker and her colleagues have
conducted research which i1as led me to be satisfied of the scientific status of
the syndrome.
Have any other psychologists conducted research testing Dr Walker's theory?

..... I am not sure.

·- ·

How could you possibly make a diagnosis of "Battered Woman Syndrome"
having only seen lvfrs Forrester after the killing, and then only on eight
occasions over a short period of time? ........ Eight sessions enables a

psychologist to gain a strong idea of someone's personality and behaviour. The
behaviour exhibited, and symptoms described by Mrs Forrester, were
consistent with my experience and the psychological literature pertaining to
"Battered Woman Syndrome".
Exactly what experience do you have /vfs Roberts? ........ As is said earlier, I
have centred my practice around women who have been abused by their
partners, and I have seen a large number of them.
Could you tell the Court how many battered women you have seen in your
twelve years ofpractice as a forensic psychologist? ........ It's hard to say
exactly, but I would say I have seen somewhere between 100 and 200 battered

women.
How do you know that any of these women have the Battered Woman
Syndrome? ........ Based on the research of Dr Walker and her colleagues.
That doesn't really help the present situation though does it l'vfs Roberts, given
that each case should be considered individually? ........ It is true that I

consider each case individually.
You said in your evidence that Mrs Forrester was suffering from learned

helplessness? ........ Yes.
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/-low cw1 a woman who is so helpless thot she cun't make dccisionsjhr her.\·e/f
turn arotmd inumalfcr ofminutes and ln·co!lw a co/d-hlom/cd killer'! ....... .
This has been explained in Dr Walker's research.
MR JONES: I have 110 further questions Your l-lonour.
HER HONOUR: Yes. Mrs Smith. would you cull your IH!Xt witness plcasc?
MRS Si'vtiTI-I: No Your Honour, that ends the Defence case.
HER HONOUR: Very well. Mr Jones, would you like to present your closing
statement to the juty?
Closing statement, Prosecution lawyer
MR JONES: Thankynu Your Honour. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you
have heard from the pathologist that Mr Forrester died from stab wounds to the
chest and abdomen area. You have heard that the defendant admitted to police
that she killed her husband. The issue which .'/OU must decide is whether Mrs
Forrester was acting in defence of her life. fl; whether she was unjustified in
killing her husband. You have heard Mrs Forrester claim that she \Vas battered
by her husband for the past fifteen years.
The psychologist called for the defence, Ms Roberts, has told you that
Mrs Forrester's situation was a "text book case" of Battered Woman
Syndrome, and that this is the reason she felt in fear of her life. However, in
light of the evidence presented by Ms Hathaway, that Battered Woman
Syndrome is by no means a scientitically rigorous syndrome, you should ask
yourselves two things: Firstly, is there sufficient weight attached to battered
woman syndrome as a psychological condition, and secondly whether an
expert is able to conclu~ively say that Mrs Forrester was in fact suffering from
this condition, and because she was in fear of her life, killed her husband. The
alternative, which the prosecution has argued is the case, is that Mrs Forrester
was unjustii1...:d in killing her husband and is thus guilty of murder.
You should consider why Mrs Forrester returned to her husband on the
three occasions that sh'.! left him. I suggest that you should be very sceptical
that Mrs Forrester was in fear of her life, given her evidence that she was able
to leave the relationship on three separate occasions and that she also decided
to return to her husband each time. I ask you to consider why she did not leave
on this occasion rather than killing her husband.
There is little evidence apart from the word of Rosemary Forrester that
any of these things actually happened to her. I put it to you that Mrs Forrester
killed her husband in retaliation for the abuse she claims to have suffered. She
did not kill him because she was in fear of her life as the defence would have
you believe. When yiJu weigh up all the facts you must find that Rosemary
Forrester is guilty of murdering her husband.
Defence lawyer
Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard from the defendant herself that
she was subjected to horrendous abuse for most of her fifteen year marriage to
Gerald F arrester. The details of this abuse and intimidation are beyond the
imagination of the average person. Mrs Forrester was the victim of a man who
covered up his own feelings of inadequacy by intimidating and abusing his
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wife. I lc controlled her every action, humiliated her and psychologically
tortured her. Despite this, Rosematy Forrester still cared for her hushand and
believed his promises that he would not hurt her ngain. Ms Rohcrts, the
psychnlogi:;t, gave evidence that Rosemary Forn..:stl!r su!Tl!rt!d from Battl:rcd
Woman syndrome, an established psychological phenomenon which Jcscribes
common characteristics ofhatterl:d women. Shc said that Mrs hJTTcstcr's
behaviour on the night in question was understandable, given the constant
abuse and threats, and the fear she held lOr her life.
The reason Mrs Forrester returned to her husband alter leaving on three
occasions was that she fully believed her husband when he said he had
changed, and believed his promises that he would not be violent toward her
agam.
Rosemary Forrester killed her husband in self defence of her own life.
This woman has lived in fear for her life and safety for the last fifteen years.
She has been degraded, attacked, sexually abused, humiliated, and intimidated
by her husband. She returned home early from the hospital after a serious
injury bec<J'JSe she was afraid of the consequences if she did not. Rosemary
Forrester has suffered unbelievable abuse and degradation, and lived in
constant fear of her life. You must find her not guilty of murder and acquit her
on the basis of the self defence that she used to avoid death or serious injury at
the hands of her husband.

Judge's instructions
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you will shortly be asked to retire to
consider your verdict in this trial. The charge against Mrs Forrester is that she
murdered her husband Gerald Forrester. A person who is charged with a
criminal offence is said to be presumed innocent unless and until the Crown
proves the allegations against her, as it is required to do. You can only return a
guilty verdict if you are satisfied on the evidence before you that the guilt of
the accused woman has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To do this, the Crown must prove firstly that the act of murder was
committed, and secondly that the accused acted without lawful justification.
One form of law~ul justification available to the accused upon the evidence in
this case is self~df:fence, and you have heard from the defence lawyer that Mrs
Forrester claims she acted in self defence when she killed her husband. I will
instruct you :tbout self defence shortly, but firstly I must tell you the elements
of murder am! mam;laughter which must be satisfied for you to deliver a
verdict of guilty 0f either murder or manslaughter. The third option open to
you is a verdict ofNot Guilty, which I will instruct you about shortly.
To deliver a verdict of guilty to murder, each of the following elements
must be satisfied, by the Crown, beyond reasonable doubt: i) that the accused
was of sound mind, ii) that the accused was the cause of death of the deceased,
iii) that the act was a conscious, voluntary one and iv} that the act was
perfonned with the intention of either killing the deceased or of causing really
serious injury to him. There is no dispute as to the first two elements of
murder. The dispute arises over whether Mrs Forrester intended to cause the
death of, or serious injury to, her husband. You have heard the prosecution
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argument that this is in f:1ct the case. llowever, the dcli.!ncr.: argument is that
Mrs Forrester acted in sclf-dl!!Cncc oflwr own lifC. You must weigh up the
evidence and decide if the killing was intentional or done ins r.:lfdcfCncc.
To deliver a verdict of not guilty of murder but guilty or manslaughter,
each of the fOllowing elements must br.: established, by the Crown, br.:yond
reasonable doubt: i) that the act was a conscious, voluntary and deliberate one,
ii) that the act was unlawful, that is, th'! accused was not acting in sclfdcfi!nce,
and iii) that a reasonable person in the position of the accused \vould have
realised that the act would expose the deceased to an appreciable risk of death
or serious bodily harm.
If you arc unsure about any of the elements outlined above, then you
will need to consider whether the accused had a lawful justification in acting
as you find she did. The lawful justification of self defence exists when the
acts of the accused were done as the result of her believing upon reasonable
grounds that they were necessary in order to defend herself from the actual or
threatened violence of another. If you find that this was the case here, then
your verdict wouid be one of Not Guilty. It is both good law and good sense
that a person who is attacked may defend herself. However it is neither good
law nor sensible that a person should be permitted, under the pretence of
defending herself, to attack another or to retaliate for a past attack.
It is therefore necessary to consider the accused's actions and the
surrounding circumstances in ordec to determine whether she acted in selfdefence or in pursuit of some other purpose. The following considerations may
bear upon this question:
1. Was the action against which the accused says she was defending herself
the kind of action which calls for self-defence or was it something a sensible
person would ignore?
2. Was it an action the consequences of which could easily be avoided by the
accused retreating from the situation created? Although she is not obliged to
retreat, and indeed, to do so may in some cases be a dangerous thing to
attempt, the failure to take obvious evasive action might well indicate an
intention to use the occasion for aggression or retaliation rather than for selfdefence. You have heard from Mrs Forrester that she returned to her husband
after leaving him on three occasions. She told you she did this because she
believed each time that he had changed and would no longer abuse her, and
because she was financially dependent on her husband. It is a matter for you to
decide if she held a reasonable belief that she was in danger of serious injury
or loss of life, and was unable to retreat from the situation.
3. Did the accused use unnecessary force? Although a person who is attacked
is not required to weigh to a nicety the extent of force required to resist the
attack, the use of force plainly disproportionate to the attack may also indicate
a use of the occasion for aggression or retaliation rather than for self-defence.
If a jury came to the view that an accused person did only what she believed or
honestly thought was necessary in the circumstances, then that would be a very
powerful indicator that her conduct was not entirely out of proportion to the
necessities of the situation. Nevertheless, the accused has no onus cast on her
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in re!ipcet of this or indeed of any other m~ans. Slw is not obliged to
demonstrate that her conduct was n:asonablc in th!.! circumstances.
Where the viol!.!nt aLtivity has re~ulted in tle:.1th, as is the case here, you
should have l'urtlier regard to the intention of the accust:d: I r you arc satislicd
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to kill or to causl: grievous
bodily harm by her acts then you should consider whether sut:h an intention is
nevertheless consistent with her acting in selrdefcncc./\ person is entitled to
kill or cause grievous bodily harm in defending hersclr. However, a person
who kills with the intention of killing or of doing serious bodily harm can
hardly believe on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to do so in order to
defend herself unless she pcrccives a threat which calls for that response. It is
for you to consider in such a case whether the accused believed, and if so,
whether she had reasonable grounds for such a belief, that it was necessary to
kill or do serious bodily injury in order to defend herself.
4. Were you not satisfied that the accused intended to kill or cause l:lodily
harm you should consider the reasonableness of her belief as to the need to act
as she intended to act.
AI! these are illustrations of questions you should examine in order to
determine the ultimate question: "Has the Crown proved that the accused was
acting unlawfully because she did not believe on reasonable grounds that what
she did was necessary to defend herself?" It is for you, the jury, to examine all
the circumstances as you find them to have been, and to consider both the
actual belief of the accused and the reasonableness of her fanning su~h a
belief. An irrational fear or a belief formed without reasonable ground for it
does not justify violent activity by the accused.
It is for you to decide how much weight to place on all the evidence
given, but I will make a comment on the expert evidence proffered in this case.
Conflicting evidence was presented by two forensic psychologists. Ms
Hathaway, called for the prosecution, told you that there is a psychological
condition, "Battered Woman Syndrome", proposed in the psychological
literature. She gave evidence that in her opinion there is no scientific basis for
this syndrome. In contrast, Ms Roberts, called for the defence, told you that the
psychological condition known as ''Battered Woman Syndrome" has been
scientifically tested. She told that Mrs Forrester was suffering from "Battered
Woman Syndrome", and that her actions in killing her husband were consistent
with this. It is a matter for you to decide whether Mrs Forrester was suffering
from "Battered Woman Syndrome". If you find that she was, and conclude on
this 'msis that her actions can be seen as reasonable, you must decide if she
was therefore acting in self defence, according to the criteria I have outlined.
You must remember that the Battered Woman Syndrome is not a defence
itself. It is part of the history and the cumulated set of circumstances which the
defence has put into the whole case, ultimately to argue that the Crown has not
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. You are free to accept or reject any
part of this expert evidence. You are the triers of fact who must decide the
ultimate issue, which is whether Rosemary Forrester is guilty of murder. You
need to assess whether the opinion of an expert can assist you in making that
decision.
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The Crown, in order to secure the verdictf(>r which it wntends, would
be requin:d to estnb\ish beyond reasonable doubt tlutt Mrs l·orre-..tcr'.'> condm:t
was not reasonable in the circumstances. You willunder·,tand, tiH.:rcfon.:, til at
before the possibility of self ddi:nt:c can he regarded a., hemg exclt~th:d, the
Crown would be required to establish one of two thing'>: hr•,tly. that there wa'i
no occasion for self dcfcrH:e. That means, that there v.a'> 1111 attack at all and
that there was no npprchcnsion by the accused that any o.;uch a \lack wa\ to he
made on her. Sl!condly, thl! Crown would nt.!cd to estahli'>h that what tht:
accused woman did was l!ntirely out of proportion to the danger confronting

her.
If the Crown has established either of tlll!SC rroposition hcyond
reasonablt: doubt and thl! other clements or murder art.! also made out, then
your proper verdict would be guilty of murder. I fyou find that Mrs J·orrcster
held the unreasonable belief that the force she used against her hu'>hand was
reasonnblc, then your verdict would be not Guilty of murder, but (Juilty of
Manslaughter. However, if you came to the view that tht: Crown had t;1ileJ to
exclude these possibilities, or if you find that Mrs Forrester was acting in self
defence, then your verdict would be Not Guilty.
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Appendix .D. Sample questionnaire: Both experts, Retreat condition
Now that you have read the transcript of this mock trial, please take a few
moments to complete the following questions. Answer all questions in the
order in whiv_ they appear. Please don't tum any pages until you have
completed ear:h page. Do not return to pages once they arc completed. Please
do not return to the transcript while answering the questions - I want your
responses based on what you can remember. Please remember to answer as if
you are an actual juror in this Trial. Once you have competed the
questionnaire, please return only it and the consent from to your distributor in
the envelope provided.

Verdict

In your view, is Rosemary Forrester:

0

0

0
Guilty of murder

or

or

Guilty of manslaughter

Not Guilty?

(Tick one box only)

How certain are you about this decision?
Please indicate by circling the appropriate number on the seven point scale
below:
not at all
certain

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

completely
certain

What had the biggest influence on your verdict?

If you ticked "guilty" what tvpe of sentence would you impose:
Please tick one of the boxes:
• None - let defendant go free
0
• Good Behaviour Bond (released on entering a bond to be of good behaviour
for a set amount of time)
0
• Community based work
0
• Suspended prison sentence (not served unless conditions outlined by the
Court are breached)
0
• Prison sentence (to be served immediately)
0
• Don't know
0
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If you ticked "guilty" and "prison sentence", what length or
sentence would you impose Please circle the number of years on the
scale below:

no. yrs I

20

2

3

4

5 6

7

8 9

I 0 II 12 13 14 I 5 16 17 18 19

20+

Please answer the tollowing questions about yourself:

Sex:

Age:

female

male

0

0

Highest Education level achieved. Please tick the box which best
describes the level of education you have completed. Also indicate the number
of years you have attended for your most recent schooling.
completed

Primary School
Secondary School

TAFE
Tertiary under graduate
Tertiary Post graduate

years of
schooling

0
0
0
0
0

Marital status. Please indicate which one of the following categories best
describes you:

Single

In relationship, not living with partner
Defacto
Defacto but separated
MruTied
Married but separated
Married but divorced
Widow I widower

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Current occupation:

Briefly describe:
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If unemployed I retired, please indicate the most recent job you held:

Jury experience:

Have you sat on a jury before?

yes

no

0

0

If yes, what charges were you delivering a verdict on?

In this next section of the questionnaire you will be asked questions about
various aspects of the case. Please read each item carefully and circle the
number on the seven point scale which best reflects your opinion. Please be
sure to look at both ends of the scale before circling your response, as they are
not the same for each item.

How believable do you think Mrs Forrester's account of the abuse she suffered
was?
not at all
believable

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

totally
believable

To what extent do you think Mrs Forrester's life was in danger throughout her
marriage to Gerald F arrester?
not at all
in danger

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

extremely
in danger

5

6

7

totally

Did Mrs Forrester contribute to the abuse?
not at all

l

2

3

4

Do you think that Mrs Forrester believed that the force she used against her
husband was necessary to prevent serious injury or death to herself?
not at all
likely

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

extremely
likely
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How much did you rely on the Psychologist's evidence presented in the
Defence case about "Battered Woman Syndrome" in reaching your verdict?

2

not at all

3

4

5

6

7

relied
completely

How much did you rely on the Psychologist's evidence presented in the
Prosecution case about "Battered Woman Syndrome" in reaching your verdict?

2

not at all

3

4

5

6

7

relied
completely

How much, if at all, do you believe the "Battered Woman Syndrome" to be a
psychological condition?

2
3
6
7
do not believe 1
4
5
at all
Ifyou answered (I) to this question, skip the following question.

completely
believe

To what extent do you think the "Battered Woman Syndrome" applies to Mrs
Forrester?
not at all

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

applies
completely

How severely, if at all, do you think Mrs Forrester was beaten by her husband
on the evening in question?
not at all
beaten

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
severely
beaten

To what extent do you think Mrs Forrester thought her life was in danger on
the evening of the crime in question?
not at all
in danger

2

3

4

5

6

7

extremely
in danger
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To what extent do you think Mrs Forrester could have permanently stayed
away from her husband on the three occasions that she left him?
could not stay
easily
away at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

could
stay away

To what extent do you think Mrs Forrester's life was in danger on the evening
of the crime in question?
not at all
in danger

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

extremely
in danger

If you have any further comments or queries, please feel free to write them
below. If there is any matter which you would like clarified, please include
your address with your comments, and I will reply to you as soon as possible.

Please return this questionnaire and the consent form to your distributor. It is
not necessary to return the transcript I Explanation of Research Project.

82

'

